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INTRODUCTION
Forty-three years after issuing a decision intended to settle the
abortion dispute once and for all, 1 and twenty-four years after calling
on the “contending sides of a national controversy to end their
national division,” 2 the Supreme Court is at it again. 3 But just as the

*
Sandra Day O’Connor Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of
William & Mary. This paper is an outgrowth both of conversations with Caitlin Borgmann and of
remarks I made at the June 2015 Privacy Discussion Forum organized by Russ Weaver and held
at the University of Paris. Thanks to the Vanderbilt Law Review for organizing this symposium
and thanks to my research assistants Caitlin Carter, Andrew DeVore, Phil Giammona, and Russ
Terman.
1.
See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 580–99 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court’s drafting of its Roe
decision).
2.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
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fates of Roe v. Wade (in 1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (in
1992) were ultimately left to elected officials, interest groups, and the
like, the Court’s handiwork will be judged yet again by whether it is
well or poorly suited to 2016 political conditions. So let’s have at it.
This Article will argue that now is the time for the Court to
decisively intervene in the abortion controversy by issuing a
maximalist Roe-like decision; today’s politics do not support an
indeterminate standard like Casey’s undue burden test. In other
words, assuming that there is a constitutional right to abortion, 4
today’s Court should assume the heroic role Erwin Chemerinsky
embraces in The Case Against the Supreme Court and other writings; 5
specifically, the Court should “protect the rights of minorities who
cannot rely on the political process.” 6 For Chemerinsky, protecting the
rights of minorities is the “primary reason for having a Supreme
Court,” and is “why the Justices of the Supreme Court . . . are granted
life tenure.” 7
In explaining why today’s Court should decisively protect
abortion rights, this Article will evaluate a common criticism of Roe v.
Wade, that the decision unnecessarily perpetuated counterproductive,
divisive backlash by seeking to short circuit the political process and
mandate an abortion code generally unacceptable to the nation. Leftleaning academics, advocates, and judges have made this criticism—
including Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Cass Sunstein, Jeff Rosen, Mike
3.
On November 13, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Whole Women’s Health
v. Cole, a constitutional challenge to a 2013 Texas statute that both requires physicians who
perform abortions to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and mandates that abortion
clinics have facilities equal to an outpatient surgical center. 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). For discussion
of the possible implications of the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on the Whole Health decision,
see Dahlia Lithwick, The Conservative Era is Over, SLATE (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/antonin_scalia_s_death_has_changed_the_way
_the_supreme_court_and_conservative.html
[https://perma.cc/2Y3T-2YAX].
For
further
discussion, see infra notes 292–294.
4.
As will become clear, this Article advances a theory about when the Supreme Court
should issue minimalist or maximalist opinions. My concern is the scope of judicial rulings; the
question of whether there is a constitutional right to abortion is not addressed.
5.
Prominent examples include ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON
THE CONSTITUTION (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989).
6.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 10 (2014). No doubt,
pro-life interests see fetuses as minorities and deserving of constitutional protection for this
reason. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, HUMAN LIFE REV.
(Feb. 3 1983), http://www.humanlifereview.com/abortion-and-the-conscience-of-the-nationronald-reagan-the-10th-anniversary-of-the-supreme-court-decision-in-roe-v-wade-is-a-good-timefor-us-to-pause-and-reflect-our-nationwide-policy-of-abortion-o/ [https://perma.cc/TTG2-4ZTT]. If
that view were accepted, there would be no right to abortion; my Article, however, assumes there
is a constitutional right to abortion.
7.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 9–10.
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Klarman, Gerald Rosenberg, and Bill Eskridge. 8 In earlier writings, I
too criticized Roe on these grounds and, correspondingly, celebrated
Pennsylvania v. Casey for recalibrating abortion rights in ways that
matched prevailing views of popular opinion and elected official
preferences. 9
In the pages that follow, I will argue that I and others
miscalculated the possible virtues of a rigid decisional rule. In
particular, I will explain how party polarization and the related rise of
the Tea Party calls into question the benefits of an indeterminate
standard in the modern abortion context. And while I will not disavow
earlier writings, I will contend that events of the past five years
suggest that proponents of the Casey compromise need to recognize
that today’s political dynamic is far different than the political
dynamic in 1973 (when Roe was decided) or 1992 (when Casey was
decided)—so much so that any theory of constitutional rights moored
to an understanding of the political process must take recent
developments into account. 10 For much the same reason, theories of
Supreme Court decisionmaking that look to the people or elected
officials to engage in constitutional deliberation must too be updated
to take into account party polarization. 11

8.
See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA 95 (2006) (discussing divisiveness of state abortion laws after Roe); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 262–64 (2d ed.
2008) (same); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT, 114–15 (1999) (analogizing post-Roe liberalization of abortion laws to physician-assisted
suicide); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 519 (2001); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992) (same); Jason Keyser, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade
Ruling Flawed, HUFFINGTON POST, (July 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/11/
ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade_n_3261187.html
[https://perma.cc/2KVW-6CWK]
(same);
Michael J. Klarman, Roe’s Backlash, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 11, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2008/09/roes-backlash.html [https://perma.cc/6PLG-2EML] (same).
9.
I have made this claim on several occasions, including in NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION
DEBATE (1996) [hereinafter DEVINS, SHAPING]; Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318 (2009) [hereinafter Devins, Abortion
Wars]; Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1981–82 (1999)
[hereinafter Devins, Democracy-Forcing] (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)).
10. Examples of such theories include judicial minimalism (the focus of this Article), the
debate over rules versus standards, and related backlash theories that call upon the Supreme
Court to moderate their decisionmaking to take potential elected government resistance into
account. For one prominent example, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE (1998).
11. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (calling for populist control of constitutional interpretation); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (calling for the
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In particular, an indeterminate standard may facilitate
political discourse—but only if political discourse is possible. 12 In the
1970s and even around 1992 (when Casey was decided), political
discourse on abortion rights was possible—as the issue did not deeply
divide Democrats and Republicans and, relatedly, we did not live in a
world of red-state, blue-state politics where one political coalition or
the other dominates state political discourse on divisive social issues. 13
Today, political discourse is not possible in deep-red or deep-blue
states, and there is more reason for the Supreme Court to opt for a
decisional rule that provides greater guidance to lower courts. 14
Indeed, one of the striking features of the Roe to Casey period is that
less polarized political actors actually sought common ground
immediately after Roe, and post-Roe legislation was rarely in direct
conflict with Roe. 15 Today, red state political actors are not interested
in compromise; in an effort to demonstrate their pro-life bona fides,
288 abortion restrictions have been enacted since 2011, fifty-seven of
them in 2015. 16 Red state lawmakers, moreover, are now enacting
legislation directly in conflict with the one determinate holding of
Casey—that states cannot outlaw abortion until fetal viability. 17
My assessment is a first cut at the question of how party
polarization impacts our understanding of constitutional theories
grounded in Court-elected government dialogue; specifically, I will
focus my discussion on judicial minimalism theory. Judicial
minimalism dates back to at least Alexander Bickel’s 1961 call for the
Court to exercise the “passive virtues” and leave things undecided, so
that elected government could initially resolve constitutional
questions; 18 it was updated by Cass Sunstein, Richard Fallon, Mike
Dorf, and Neal Katyal around 2000. 19 Minimalism remains vibrant
abandonment of judicial review from the Courts—so that elected government, most notably
Congress, can take ownership of the Constitution).
12. Political discourse is valued in some but not all theories that call for the Supreme Court
to take political context into account. For reasons I will discuss infra Part II, it is critical to
judicial minimalism theory, which is the focus of this Article.
13. See infra notes 63–154.
14. See infra notes 183–251.
15. See infra notes 103–104.
16. See Editorial, The Reproductive Rights Rollback of 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/the-reproductive-rights-rollback-of2015.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L4D9-MC2N].
17. See infra discussion accompanying notes 224–230.
18. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986); Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
19. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8 (arguing for judicial minimalism); Michael C. Dorf,
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998) (advocating judicial
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and is almost certainly the most important contemporary
constitutional theory that formally takes into account the dynamic
between the Supreme Court and elected government. 20
My analysis will be organized as follows: In Part I, I will
provide a quick tour of minimalism theory, contrasting minimalism to
the heroic vision of the Supreme Court championed by Erwin
Chemerinsky. Part I will also summarize minimalist critiques of Roe
and explain the relevance of party polarization to the minimalism
debate. Part II, the heart of this Article, will use abortion as a case
study to examine when minimalism should be embraced and when it
should be disavowed. By contrasting state practices around the time of
Roe and Casey (when there was comparatively little polarization) to
state practices today (when there is extreme polarization), I will argue
both that an indeterminate Casey-like standard would have been
better suited to the less polarized 1973 period and that a rule-like Roe
standard would be better suited to today’s world of highly polarized
red and blue states. I will also consider the transitional 1992–2009
period, explaining why the Casey compromise—which had largely
stabilized abortion politics during this period—was nonetheless
doomed to fail in the face of continuing polarization. 21 In Part III, I
will again consider minimalism theory, arguing that minimalism
theory is incomplete in that it does not meaningfully consider
decentralized decision making by the states and the related possibility
that state actors will register entrenched political differences (rather
than engage in the constructive constitutional dialogues embraced by
minimalists). 22
I. MINIMALISM THEORY AND ABORTION
Judicial minimalism is a counter to the heroic vision of judging
championed by Erwin Chemerinsky. “Heroes believe in a large and
potentially transformative role for the federal judiciary in the
Constitution’s name[;]” most significantly, they are “entirely willing to
invoke an ambitious understanding of the Constitution to invalidate
minimalism in statutory interpretation); Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1709 (1998) (suggesting judicial “advicegiving” can achieve judicial minimalism).
20. On the continued salience of minimalism, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELFGOVERNANCE 97–98 (2012).
21. In this discussion, I will seek to harmonize my earlier writings on abortion and
minimalism with my current thinking on these topics. See infra notes 180–185.
22. I do not mean to suggest that minimalism theory never references political context; it
sometimes does and I will discuss that in Part I. My point is that minimalism theory needs to be
updated to formally take account of pervasive party polarization.
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the decisions of the federal government.” 23 The Case Against the
Supreme Court, for example, takes on the Warren Court for doing
“much less than it needed to and should have done, even in the areas
of its greatest accomplishments, such as school desegregation and
ensuring counsel for criminal defendants.” 24 Under this view, the
Court was wrong to take into account potential backlash to its decision
by denying certiorari and otherwise avoiding desegregation and
related controversies in the immediate aftermath of Brown. 25 The
Court likewise committed error by embracing a vague indeterminate
standard—“all deliberate speed”—in its initial remedial order; the
Court, instead, should have told “the lower courts that would be
responsible for implementing Brown about what they were supposed
to do,” including “deadlines or timelines” and “techniques or
approaches to desegregating schools.” 26
On abortion, The Case Against the Supreme Court is largely
silent. Chemerinsky notes that abortion is “enormously controversial”
and that “[t]ens of millions of women have had safe, legal abortions
that would not have occurred without Roe v. Wade.” 27 In other recent
writings, Chemerinsky has defended Roe, arguing that the state’s
interest in fetal life begins with viability and that it would
impermissibly promote religion to say that fetal life begins any time
earlier. 28 More to the point, from a heroic perspective, the Supreme
23. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 5 (2015). Sunstein notes that heroes
come in all ideological stripes—some, like Chemerinsky, “emphasize equality on the basis of race,
sex, and sexual orientation” while others “stress the limited power of the national government
and the importance of private property and freedom of contract.” Id.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 155.
25. Id. at 139–40 (noting the long delay after Brown and before the issuing of its busing
order in 1971); see also Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court
Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1475–76 (1994) (noting the
Justices’ refusal to decide an anti-miscegenation issue in 1956 was linked to risks of such a
ruling “thwarting” or “undermining” Brown); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34–44 (1979)
(noting compromises of Justices in reaching unanimity in Brown and, relatedly, showing the
Court’s concern that the decision be accepted as legitimate by elected officials).
26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 139.
27. Id. at 289. Reviews of the book noted that Chemerinsky largely steers clear of abortion.
See Terry Eastland, Book Review: ‘The Case Against the Supreme Court’ by Erwin Chemerinsky,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/book-review-the-case-againstthe-supreme-court-by-erwin-chemerinsky-1411598692 [http://perma.cc/4YAN-3B96]; David G.
Savage, Review: ‘The Case Against the Supreme Court’ Pushes for Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19,
2014),
http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-ca-jc-erwin-chermerinsky-20140921story.html [https://perma.cc/6KBD-5WV8].
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 173–74. This position is critiqued by Eric Posner in his
review of the book. See Eric A. Posner, One Side Now, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 1, 2011),
https://newrepublic.com/article/78394/one-side-now-warren-court [https://perma.cc/7KRP-HHPP]
(arguing that religious values can inform public debate and that not all criticism of the viability
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Court did in Roe what it failed to do in Brown. The trimester standard
essentially served as a legislative code that instructed lower court
judges on how to implement the ruling. 29 The Court correspondingly
eschewed an incremental approach that would obviate potential
backlash or encourage democratic experimentation. By choosing
viability as the point where the state’s interest in future life became
compelling, the Justices embraced a rule at odds with public opinion—
as public opinion at the time generally supported first but not second
trimester abortions. 30
Roe v. Wade, in other words, seems exemplary of
Chemerinsky’s “all in” approach; an approach that sees the Court’s
primary function as vindicating constitutional rights for those
unprotected in the political process—and vindication means muscular
decisions that do not countenance delay or narrow, indeterminate
rulings. In sharp contrast, judicial minimalists embrace a far more
modest role for the courts and, relatedly, a larger role for elected
officials. Minimalists, in varying degrees, value democratic
deliberation, take account of potential backlash, and recognize other
limits in judicial capacity that might result in a more modest ruling. 31
Judicial minimalism comes in two forms. 32 Procedural
minimalism (championed by Alexander Bickel) calls for the Supreme
Court to defer a decision on the merits by denying certiorari or
concluding that it lacks jurisdiction to decide a case. Substantive
minimalism (championed by Cass Sunstein and other New Judicial
Minimalists) envisions that the Supreme Court will decide the dispute
at hand but issue “narrow and shallow” decisions, which leave it to the
political process and future Court decisions to sort out most aspects of
the larger policy issue. 33
line is, in fact, religious). For a competing review that praises the book, see Tim Rutten, Book
Review: ‘The Conservative Assault on the Constitution’ by Erwin Chemerinsky, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6,
2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/06/entertainment/la-et-rutten-20101006
[https://perma.cc/5R8S-W6GW].
29. This feature of the decision was extremely controversial, even among the Justices that
supported abortion rights. See Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 1989),
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/nvp/roe/woodward.html
[https://perma.cc/7UFHAH2R].
30. See Klarman, supra note 8. For a competing view, see sources cited infra note 89.
31. One other limit is institutional constraints on the courts’ ability to understand the
relevant facts, including rapidly changing technology. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 174
(discussing how the Internet and other changes in communications technology might caution a
minimalist approach to free speech regulation).
32. For a catalogue and assessment of different iterations of minimalist theory, see
Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000).
33. Minimalist theory is neither determinate nor monolithic. The determination of whether
a decision is, in fact, narrow or shallow is largely “in the eye of the beholder.” Jeffrey Rosen, The
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In critical respects, both procedural and substantive
minimalism seek to facilitate constructive constitutional dialogues
between the Court, elected government, and the people. For Bickel,
the Court is dependent upon the political branches in two interrelated
ways. As a practical matter, Bickel recognized that the Court’s
authority ultimately extends as far as the political process chooses to
recognize it. More philosophically, Bickel believed that the principles
from which good constitutional decisions are wrought ultimately come
from colloquy among the three branches of government. Delay,
therefore, has the advantage of allowing the “full political and
historical context, the relationship between the Court and the
representative institutions of government” to be made clearer. 34 Once
a constitutional principle has suitably ripened, however, Bickel
thought that the Court may rule broadly, for the Court was the branch
best suited to “dealings with matters of principle.” 35
Unlike the juricentric focus of procedural minimalism,
substantive minimalism is motivated primarily by polycentrism. 36 For
New Judicial Minimalists, political decision making is preferred to
judicial decision making. Some New Minimalists argue that the Court
should articulate fundamental values but then “leave the
implementation of those values mostly to the political process.” 37
Others imagine a more vigorous, but nonetheless minimalist, judicial
role. Cass Sunstein, for example, sees the Court playing the role of
active facilitator—catalyzing democratic processes “rather than
preempt[ing] democratic deliberation.” 38 In this way, minimalism
“attempts to promote the democratic ideals of participation,
deliberation, and responsiveness” and “allows continued space for
Age of Mixed Results, NEW REPUBLIC (June 27, 1999), https://newrepublic.com/article/74083/theage-mixed-results [https://perma.cc/53AZ-AHV7]. Moreover, minimalism has been subject to
criticism as “ambiguous” and Sunstein’s thinking has evolved over the course of his numerous
writings on the subject. See James E. Fleming, The Odyssey of Cass Sunstein, 43 TULSA L. REV.
843 (2008) (synthesizing iterations of Sunstein’s minimalism into a series of “maximalist”
questions); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1957 (2005) (dubbing Sunstein’s minimalism
“ambiguous”). Nonetheless, the core of minimalism remains the same and it is that core that I
am most concerned with, that is, the idea that the Supreme Court should leave space for
democratic outlets to interpret the Constitution and shape the meaning of constitutional values.
For my purposes, minimalism (whether advanced by Sunstein or someone else) will be
considered at that level of generality.
34. BICKEL, supra note 18, at 124.
35. Id. at 25
36. Differences in procedural and substantive minimalism are spelled out in Christopher J.
Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial Minimalism, in THE JUDICIARY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 45 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005).
37. Id. at 60 (citing Dorf, supra note 19, at 79).
38. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at xiv.
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democratic reflection from Congress and the states.” 39 Furthermore,
narrow and shallow decisions avoid “takin[ing] on other people’s
deeply held moral commitments,” leaving questions of high complexity
to debate in the forum of public opinion and the legislative chamber. 40
Under this view, Court decisions should be indeterminate because
democratic deliberation best occurs in the shadow of uncertainty.
Contending that the “connection between judicial minimalism and
democratic self-government” is his “most important goal,” 41 Sunstein
concludes that the Court should only issue a “maximalist” opinion
when such a decision would cement a preexisting societal consensus. 42
As the above makes clear, the New Minimalists and Bickel
have fundamentally different views of how the courts should
collaborate with elected government. For the purposes of this Article, I
will treat procedural and substantive minimalism as two tools
available to jurists who do not want to settle a constitutional dispute
by issuing a maximalist opinion. In particular, can the minimalist
project of facilitating democratic deliberation be advanced by delaying
a decision or issuing a narrow indeterminate ruling? More to the
point, would the Court have facilitated democratic deliberation on
abortion rights if it had pursued a minimalist strategy?
The answer to this question hinges both on whether a
maximalist decision frustrates democratic deliberation and, relatedly,
whether a minimalist decision facilitates discourse. Minimalist critics
of Roe make both claims—suggesting that a minimalist decision would
have facilitated constructive discourse in ways that Roe did not.
Moreover, minimalist critics make the related argument that Roe
spurred on backlash counterproductive to the goals of reproductive
and women’s rights. To start, minimalists criticize Roe for stifling
political discourse. 43 Bill Eskridge speaks of the decision “preempt[ing]
the normal operation of politics . . . [by] hard-wiring the political
process against pro-life people.” 44 For Cass Sunstein, Roe prompted
39. Id. at x.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at xiv.
42. Id. at xiv.
43. This criticism is widespread. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and
After) Roe v Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011) for collected
sources. For a constructive counterargument suggesting that Roe did not frustrate political
discourse, see MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015).
44. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 519. For a more detailed statement of Eskridge’s thinking on
why Roe was anti-democratic and, ultimately, counterproductive, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics,
114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312–13 (2005) (“In the early 1970s . . . [t]he matter [of abortion] was one of
intense political debate, and the country was hardly at rest. Under such circumstances, the
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“destructive and unnecessary social upheaval”; 45 “the decision may
well have created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights
amendment, and undermined the women’s movement by spurring
opposition and demobilizing potential adherents.” 46 The Court,
instead, should have proceeded narrowly, “engaging in a form of
dialogue with the political process.” 47
In previous writings, I too argued that the Court should have
pursued a minimalist strategy in Roe by issuing a less ambitious
decision and then steering clear of the controversy for several years. 48
A decision limiting abortion rights to rape victims (as Roe claimed to
be) would have “appeared less extreme and, as such, may not have
galvanized pro-life interests.” Such a decision, moreover, “might well
have spurred the pro-choice community into action.” Rather than rely
on the courts to vindicate abortion rights, “pro-choice and pro-life
interests would have pursued abortion legislation in the shadow of
constitutional uncertainty. Over time, it is possible that some
consensus would have emerged.”
When advancing that claim in 1999, there was good reason to
think that such a minimalist strategy was sound. Roe’s sweeping
recognition of abortion rights seemed to prompt political discord. More
than that, the Court’s 1992 modification of Roe in Pennsylvania v.
Casey seemed to quiet the abortion wars by replacing Roe’s maximalist
trimester test with an undue burden test that seemed indeterminate
and minimalist. 49 By 2009, I was so confident that minimalist
decision-making in abortion would stave off political conflict that I
titled an article How Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars.
Today, the political landscape has changed in ways that call
into question minimalist claims about Roe. 50 The post-Casey
compromise I wrote of in 2009 now seems a distant memory. Instead,
Court should have exercised its agenda-setting authority to deny review in Roe and other cases
so that the issue could ripen.”).
45. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 114.
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991); see
also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
265, 286 (1997) (arguing that Roe “mobilized a right-to-life opposition that continues to play a
prominent role in American politics to the present day.”) For further discussion (suggesting this
claim too sweeping), see infra notes 100–106, 127–132.
47. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 114. Indeed, Sunstein claimed that Roe’s effectiveness “has
been limited, largely because of its judicial source.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 147 (1993).
48. This paragraph is drawn from Devins, Democracy-Forcing, supra note 9, at 1981–82.
49. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1328–29 (discussing this transformation).
50. Those claims may be overstated for other reasons. Recent histories of the pre- and postRoe periods suggest that Roe was less a divisive lightning rod than suggested by minimalist
critics. See infra notes 128–132, 144–148.
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party polarization and the rise of red and blue states suggests that
there is little prospect of meaningful democratic deliberation on
abortion. Put another way (and at the risk of stating the obvious):
polarization cuts against compromise, consensus, and discourse;
minimalism, correspondingly, is a strategy best pursued when
competing sides of an issue are not divided in ways that make
discourse impossible.
In Part II, I will back up these claims and explain why judicial
minimalism would have worked at the time of Roe or Casey, but not
today. My analysis will focus on New Minimalism’s goal of facilitating
democratic deliberation through narrow indeterminate rulings. 51 I will
also argue that now is the time for Roe-like maximalism. In so doing, I
will provide what I hope is a useful rethinking of judicial minimalism
with respect to issues where party polarization impairs democratic
deliberation. Specifically, by paying attention to the on-the-ground
facts of state legislative efforts to restrict abortion rights, I will both
examine and extend generally stated claims linking the desirability of
minimalist decision making to the realities of democratic deliberation.
Sunstein, for example, argues that the “Court usually does best if it
proceeds narrowly,” 52 but recognizes that Chemerinsky’s heroism is
better than minimalism in a society in which “judges make the right
judgments about justice” and in which “democratic processes work
exceedingly poorly, in the sense that they do not live up to democratic
ideals, and also in which political majorities invade fundamental
rights.” 53 Sunstein and other minimalist critics of Roe, however, have
yet to think about the realities of party polarization and its impact on
abortion decision making 54 or minimalism in general. 55 For reasons I
will explain in Part II, the red-state, blue-state divide severely
undermines the judicial minimalism project and, correspondingly,

51. I will also make mention of counterproductive backlash risks but will draw a line
between backlash concerns (which have nothing to do with democratic deliberation but, instead,
focus on the best means of advancing favored policy goals) and democratic deliberation goals
(which would accept suboptimal policy on the underlying issue, for the principal goal is
facilitating discourse among elected officials, interest groups, and the American people).
52. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2006).
53. SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 65; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2867–68 (2006).
54. In his 2009 book, Radicals in Robes, and his 2015 book, Constitutional Personae,
Sunstein continues to make the same arguments about Roe. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES 106 (2009); SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 29, 100.
55. Party polarization also shapes judicial decision-making and therefore pervades
decision-making by all parts of government. In other words, the conditions that cut against
minimalism may also cut against heroism. For additional discussion, see infra Part II.
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provides important support for the expansive view of judicial
authority championed by Chemerinsky.
II. WHAT ABORTION POLITICS TELLS US ABOUT JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
Judicial minimalism’s critique of Roe had some force at the
time of Roe, but now seems misplaced. Instead, the saga of abortion
politics speaks to the critical impact of party polarization on
democratic discourse and, correspondingly, the workability of judicial
minimalism theory. First, contrary to claims that Roe triggered the
abortion wars when it was decided in 1973, recent scholarship about
politics at the time of Roe suggests both that the right-to-life
movement was energized before Roe and that there was some prospect
of constructive political discourse in the immediate post-Roe period. 56
More generally, Democrats and Republicans did not divide over
abortion at that time and, consequently, constructive democratic
deliberation was more possible during the less polarized 1970s. That
is not to say that Roe and its rigid trimester test matched public
opinion (it did not), nor is it to say that the decision did not trigger a
backlash (it did); 57 a minimalist ruling would have fit the times better
than the overly legislative Roe ruling. Second, today’s abortion fight is
linked to the post-1980 efforts of Democrats and Republicans to win
favor with their constituents by staking out hard-line positions on
abortion. 58 In other words, the Court was (and is) “being played for
political profit” in a fight that is no longer about abortion rights but,
instead, is “about American politics more generally.” 59 In truth,
Democrat and Republican voters did not divide on abortion until 1988;
consequently, cross-party dialogue and bipartisan decision making
was very much possible in the period leading up to and including the
1992 Pennsylvania v. Casey decision. 60 Third, the Court’s embrace of
an indeterminate minimalist standard in Casey highlights the limits
56. On the rise of the right-to-life movement, see GARROW, supra note 1; Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 407 (2007). On the possibility of political discourse at the time of Roe, see Mary Ziegler,
Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Polarization and Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969,
995–96 (2014) (discussing possibility of dialogue and compromise in period immediately following
Roe).
57. See supra notes 44–47; see also infra notes 120–123.
58. See infra notes 112–119 and accompanying text.
59. Barry Friedman, The Subterranean World of Abortion Politics, BALKINIZATION (Sept.
18, 2008, 6:35 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/09/subterranean-world-of-abortionpolitics.html [https://perma.cc/38B2-48JA].
60. See infra notes 120–126 and accompanying text (discussing both public opinion polls
and responses to Roe up to and including the bipartisan Pennsylvania statute that the Court
ruled on in Casey).
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of minimalism in today’s polarized environment. During the 1992–
2008 period, the laws approved by the Court in Casey were politically
popular and Casey served as a generally acceptable legislative
template. 61 By 2010, however, that template became less and less
acceptable to pro-life interests in red states. Today, the red-state, bluestate divide on abortion is so acute that political compromise seems
impossible. 62 Correspondingly, democracy-forcing judicial minimalism
now seems a pipedream; the Court has more reason today, than at any
time throughout the abortion imbroglio, to rule broadly and decisively.
A. Roe v. Wade
When Roe was decided, Democrats and Republicans often
worked together and there was little ideological division between the
two parties. In 1968, for example, Democrats occupied every
ideological niche; conservative Southern Democrats were key to the
Democratic coalition. 63 Republicans were likewise ideologically
diverse; liberal Rockefeller Republicans (mainly from the North) were
key to the Republican coalition. 64 At that time and throughout the
1970s, there was virtually no gap in the median liberal-conservative
scores of the two parties. 65 For this reason, George Wallace justified
his 1968 presidential bid by claiming that there was not a “dime’s
worth of difference” between Democrats and Republicans. 66 Democrats
and Republicans in Congress shared committee staff and came
together to resist presidential encroachments—enacting the War
Powers Resolution of 1973 over President Nixon’s veto and the 1974
Impoundment Control Act (with no dissenters in the Senate and only
six in the House). 67
61. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1334–35 (discussing general acceptance of
Roe in its aftermath).
62. See infra notes 183–251 and accompanying text.
63. See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 23 (2008) [hereinafter
THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION]; Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates:
Party Polarization in the Modern Congress 16–17 (Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.msu.edu/~rohde/Theriault.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F2B-6Z59].
64. See THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION, supra note 63, at 23–26.
65. See Steven S. Smith & Gerald Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress,
in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147, 151 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed.
2009) (reporting the lack of ideological divide).
66. Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/09/15/ex-gov-george-c-wallace-dies-at-79-inalabama/f77a36e4-0689-4086-9b96-b0d9a293cd57/ [https://perma.cc/8RYV-Q59N].
67. For a discussion of congressional committee practices, see Neal Devins, Party
Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW.
U. L. REV 737, 753–54 (2011); for a discussion of bipartisanship in enacting legislation asserting
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At the time of Roe, moreover, affluent, well-educated
Democrats and Republicans tended to agree with each other on issues
that divided their parties. 68 On issues involving civil rights and
liberties, several studies pointed to a gap between elite and popular
opinion; “[s]ocial learning, insofar as it affects support for civil
liberties, is likely to be greater among the influentials (that is,
political elites) of the society than among the mass public.” 69
Democratic and Republican elites, for example, agreed on the need for
judicial protection of powerless minorities. 70 1965–1980 attitudes
towards abortion likewise revealed a striking gap between the mass
public and Republican and Democrat elites; indeed, the best predictor
of abortion attitudes was one’s level of education. 71 Correspondingly,
public opinion polls reveal that there was no Republican-Democrat
divide on abortion during the 1970s; in a poll taken shortly before Roe
was decided, sixty-eight percent of Republicans and fifty-eight percent
of Democrats supported the statement that the decision to have an
abortion should be made by a woman and her physician. 72 Reviews of
the General Social Surveys data showed that Democrats and
Republicans held generally similar views; in fact, respondents who
identified as Republican were more likely to identify as pro-choice
from 1972–1987. 73
The absence of a party divide on abortion is also revealed in
state efforts to either liberalize or strengthen abortion restrictions in
the decade leading up to Roe. At that time, pro-choice interests scored
several victories: four states repealed previous restrictions, thirteen
states reformed their laws, and the American Medical Association and
Model Penal Code backed limited abortion rights. 74 Of the states that
congressional prerogatives, see Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political
Polarization, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 399–404 (2009).
68. For a general treatment of this topic (comparing elite attitudes in the Warren Court era
with attitudes today), see Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion,
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L. REV. 661 (2013).
69. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 233 (1983).
70. Graber, supra note 68, at 685.
71. Donald Granberg & Beth Wellsman Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends
and Determinants, 12 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 250, 254 (1980).
72. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2067–68.
73. Greg D. Adams, Abortion: Evidence of Issue Evolution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI., 718, 731
(1997). For similar findings, see sources collected in Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at
2070–71.
74. See DEVINS, SHAPING supra note 9 at, 58–59; Sarah Kliff, Thirteen Charts That
Explain How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion Rights, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/22/thirteen-charts-that-explain-howroe-v-wade-changed-abortion-rights [https://perma.cc/JVN2-R8FN].
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repealed their laws, two were strongly Democratic, one leaned
Republican, and one was split; 75 of the states that liberalized their
laws, nine were Democratic, three Republican, and one split. 76
Equally telling, states that either resisted legislative reform or
strengthened abortion restrictions were neither Democrat nor
Republican. States enacting abortion restrictions at the time of Roe
included Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut; states that
resisted reform efforts included Michigan and North Dakota. 77
Likewise, the one amicus brief that states filed in Roe was from a
bipartisan coalition of five states, represented by three Republican
and two Democratic Attorneys General. 78
At the federal level, the abortion issue was largely dormant. No
member of Congress filed an amicus brief in Roe, and a broad
bipartisan coalition of more than two hundred lawmakers filed a 1980
brief defending Congress’s appropriations power to deny federal
funding of abortion. 79 Indeed, up until 1979, “Senate Republicans were
split over abortion in about the same proportion as House Democrats.
Looking across both chambers, abortion was not a particularly
partisan issue.” 80
For its part, the Nixon White House largely steered clear of
abortion. In 1970, Nixon instructed speechwriters: “On abortion, get
off it.” 81 After Roe, he likewise directed his aides to “keep out” of the

75. The four states that repealed were Alaska (split), Hawaii (Democrat), New York (lean
Republican), and Washington (Democrat). Information about legislative composition at the time
of Roe is drawn from THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1972–
1973, at 66, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/bos_1972_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K2N4-XM93].
76. Liberalizing states with Democrat legislatures were California, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See id.
Liberalizing states with Republican legislatures were Colorado, Delaware, and Kansas. Id.
Oregon was the split state. Id. Some Democratic liberalizing states had Republican governors;
one example is New Mexico where Republican Governor David Cargo signed the bill
notwithstanding his personal opposition to abortion. GARROW, supra note 1, at 369.
77. See GARROW, supra note 1, at 369. For a more detailed treatment of state politics at
this time, see id. at 546–617.
78. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Arizona, et al., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18). The brief focused on federalism principles. Id. at 9–10.
79. Information on congressional amicus briefs in abortion is drawn from Neal Devins,
Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from Congressional Participation as Amicus
Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 946–47 (2015).
80. Adams, supra note 73, at 723.
81. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 172 (2011). In 1972, Nixon’s Department of Justice was the legal
representative of the District of Columbia in a legal challenge to the D.C. abortion prohibition.
Id. at 177. The Justice Department did not take a substantive position on abortion but, instead,
successfully sought to have the case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id.
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case. 82 The reason: when running for reelection in 1972, Nixon
thought seriously about taking a strong position against abortion in
order to win over Democratic Catholic voters. His advisor, Pat
Buchannan, strongly counseled him to do so, stating that abortion was
“a gut issue with Catholics” and a “divisive factor within the
Democratic party.” 83 Nixon, however, backed away after polling data
of Republicans and Roman Catholics revealed that he could not gain
political advantage by staking out a pro-life position on abortion. 84
Abortion was anything but a wedge issue when Roe was
decided: party identity had nothing to do with whether a state
pursued liberalization or reaffirmed restrictions. Perhaps more telling,
there was no political advantage for Democrats or Republicans to
embrace pro-choice or pro-life policies; the battle line, instead, was
principally about religion and class. Catholic interest groups opposed
abortion, 85 while elites supported abortion rights as compared to the
working and lower middle class. 86 Catholic interests, in particular,
propelled the right-to-life movement, capitalizing on “imperfections in
the political marketplace” and “thwarting” pro-choice public opinion in
the years leading up to Roe. 87
The question remains: could pro-choice and pro-life interests
have engaged in constructive political discourse at the time of Roe?
Progressive Roe critics suggest that reform efforts were afoot, with
one-third of states liberalizing abortion restrictions and public opinion
increasingly supporting limited abortion rights. 88 Defenders point to
the rise of powerful right-to-life interests, the failure of liberalization
82. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND POLICY 252
(2001); see also MCMAHON, supra note 81, at 178–79 (discussing Nixon’s refusal to take action in
response to an entreaty from Philadelphia Archbishop John Cardinal Krol).
83. Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings on S. 60 Before the S. Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong. 4197, 4201 (1973) (memorandum from
“Research” to Att’y Gen. H.R. Haldeman (Oct. 5, 1971)). At around this time, Nixon signaled
opposition to abortion by stating his opposition to “abortion on demand” and by directing military
bases to conform to state abortion laws. See MCMAHON, supra note 81, at 172.
84. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2058–59. Nixon’s interest in abortion, like
nearly all constitutional questions, was ultimately driven by political considerations and not
ideology. MCMAHON, supra note 81, at 177.
85. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2047–52 (describing the attitude of Catholic
voters toward abortion). Catholic voters, however, supported some abortion rights. See infra
note 102.
86. See supra note 71 (discussing elite support); Peter Skerry, The Class Conflict Over
Abortion, 52 THE PUB. INT. 69, 74–75 (1978), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080528
_197805205theclassconfilctoverabortionpeterskerry.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJ7B-FGVN].
87. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Law’s Labors, NEW REPUBLIC, May 1994, at 42, 44.
88. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1205 (discussing the progressive nature of abortion
politics); Eskridge, supra note 44, at 1312 (discussing the shift in public opinion toward
abortion).
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efforts in states with lopsided pro-choice majorities, and the
strengthening of abortion restrictions in some states immediately
before Roe. 89 Defenders also point to evidence that some states with a
strongly pro-choice electorate failed to reform abortion laws, and other
states that had reformed such laws came close to repealing those
reforms. Vermont, for example, did not reform its laws
notwithstanding the fact that more than seventy percent of Vermont
residents favored liberalization in 1972; 90 in New York, a 1972 veto by
Republican governor Nelson Rockefeller blocked legislation seeking to
overturn New York’s 1970 repeal of abortion prohibitions. 91
For reasons Dave Garrow and others (including me) have
detailed elsewhere, there is good reason to think that the
liberalization movement was stalled at the time of Roe. 92 On the other
hand, the rigid Roe trimester test did not match public opinion. In the
decade before Roe, changing attitudes on maternal health (and
especially the risk of fetal deformity) resulted in overwhelming public
support for limited abortion rights. 93 A study of state and federal court
invalidations of abortion restrictions in the pre-Roe period shows that
judicial invalidations matched public opinion in these states. 94
Abortion on demand, however, was without support. Only twenty-six
percent of Americans supported second trimester abortions and the
89. See David J. Garrow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court
Nominee Doesn't Know About Roe, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C3,
http://www.davidgarrow.com/File/DJG%201993%20WashPostOutlookRBGRoe20June.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Y9QZ-GWM5]; Post & Siegel, supra note 56 at 412–13; Greenhouse & Siegel,
supra note 43, at 2046. For an excellent presentation of arguments that Roe vindicated
majoritarian preferences in the face of interest group resistance, see Corinna Barrett Lain,
Upside Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 113, 133–44 (2012); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE 295–99 (2009) (suggesting that abortion rights, even without the sweeping
Roe decision, were products of their time).
90. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Empirically Evaluating the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty:
Public Opinion, State Policy, and Judicial Decisions Before Roe v. Wade 20, 4 J. OF L & COURTS 1
(2016)
http://www.princeton.edu/~jkastell/Pre_Roe_Countermajoritarian/kastellec_pre_roe_
countermajoritarian.pdf [http://perma.cc/XT6D-WKRL].
91. This episode is discussed in David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade:
An Historical Perspective, 62 ALA. L. REV. 833, 840–41 (1999).
92. See Garrow, supra note 89 (discussing how Roe came during a time of slowness for
liberal ideals); Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1433, 1467–68
(1995) (discussing how Roe emerged during a downturn in liberal thought); see also Kastellec,
supra note 90, at 25 (noting disjunction between state public opinion favoring repeal and state
legislation, concluding that “[f]or the Supreme Court to have not weighed in at all on the
constitutionality of abortion restrictions would have likely had the effect of keeping many
unpopular policies in place”).
93. See Kastellec, supra note 90, at 12 (detailing trends in public opinion); Lain, supra note
89 at 135–37 (noting changing attitudes with respect to fetal deformity risks).
94. See Kastellec, supra note 90, at 9 (stating that state judges often did not threaten the
status quo in their rulings).
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public was sharply divided about whether a desire not to have
children outside of marriage or not having enough money to support
another child were valid reasons for women to have abortions. 95
Reform efforts largely reflected public opinion; states that liberalized
abortion laws principally enacted exceptions into abortion prohibitions
to take into account fetal and maternal health as well as pregnancies
that were the result of rape or incest. 96 Roe, in other words, did more
than correct a deficiency in the political marketplace. Roe matched
elite opinion and was an effort to foreclose political discourse and
codify elite preferences. 97
This foreclosure of political discourse had two independent
effects: one particularly relevant to my analysis, one less so. One effect
(hotly debated but less relevant to my analysis) is whether Roe
effectively advanced abortion rights or, instead, triggered a backlash
that effectively undercut the pursuit of robust abortion rights. 98 The
other effect (central to this Article) is whether Roe overreached by
foreclosing democratic discourse. 99
The next subpart will examine how elected officials and, to a
lesser extent, interest groups responded to Roe. That discussion will
reveal that Roe limited, but did not foreclose, democratic deliberation.
It will also suggest that a minimalist ruling would have been more
constructive. For reasons I will now detail, I think the Roe Court
should have understood that democratic deliberation was a real
possibility, if not a certainty. More than anything, the political parties
were not polarized and there was no Republican-Democrat divide on
95. See Klarman, supra note 8 (conveying that many Americans only support abortion for a
limited number of reasons); Kastellec, supra note 90, at 12 (discussing public perception of the
reasons a woman may choose to get an abortion).
96. See Klarman, supra note 8 (noting that thirteen states adopted “therapeutic” abortion
laws between 1967 and 1971, which the public overwhelmingly supported).
97. See Granberg & Granberg, supra note 71 (examining the relationship between
socioeconomic characteristics and opinions about abortion laws); Skerry, supra note 86, at 75
(noting early 1970s opinion poll data showing that “the college-educated are decidedly more in
favor of nonmedical reasons for abortion than are those of lesser education”). For additional
discussion, see MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 144–45 (1996).
98. This is the core of Gerald Rosenberg’s argument against Roe; namely, that Roe
accomplished very little in paving the way for abortion rights. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8
(discussing legislative reform that was occurring before Roe). For my evaluation of Rosenberg’s
claim (highlighting ways that Roe was consequential), see Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1057–62 (1992). This question is also at the heart of THE CASE AGAINST THE
SUPREME COURT; Chemerinsky is most interested in maximizing the protection of minority
rights. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 288–89 (analyzing the arguments for and against
Roe).
99. See supra notes 44–47 (discussing these very claims by Bill Eskridge and Cass
Sunstein).
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the abortion issue; bipartisanship, not winner-take-all approaches,
was a real possibility. 100 And while right-to-life interests were able to
stall the reform effort at the time of Roe, there were important
countervailing forces that made political discourse and compromise
possible if not certain: namely, public support for limited abortion
rights and the rise of the women’s movement. 101 Most Catholics
supported limited abortion rights and this figured prominently into
Nixon administration calculations that a hardline anti-abortion stance
would win over predominantly Democratic Catholics. 102 Moreover, the
pro-life and pro-choice communities were not uniformly unyielding;
some pro-life and pro-choice interests were open to discourse and
compromise. 103 None of this is to say that democratic deliberation
would have been robust, nor is it to say that reforms would have come
anywhere close to the protections afforded by the Roe trimester test. It
is to say that the possibility of discourse was real, however, and that
should be sufficient for minimalists who value democratic deliberation
more than specified outcomes.
B. From Roe to Casey
At the national level, the period from Roe to Casey was one
where abortion emerged as a wedge issue dividing the parties. At the
state level and among voters, however, abortion did not sharply divide
Democrats and Republicans. Legislation was typically pursued on a
bipartisan basis and there was no red-state, blue-state divide. More
than that, while an impassable divide emerged between pro-choice
and pro-life interest groups, there is also evidence of some efforts to
find common ground, especially at the start of this period. 104 In short,
democratic deliberation was very much possible. I will argue that it
occurred and that a minimalist decision in Roe would have furthered
democracy-deliberating goals. This is particularly true with respect to
state lawmakers; the very lawmakers who were enacting abortion
restrictions in the shadow of the Roe decision. 105
100. See supra notes 63–67 (discussing bipartisan politics).
101. See supra notes 72–73 (noting opinion data, including data showing Democrats and
Republicans both supported abortion rights). On the linkage between abortion and gender
equality, see Graber, supra note 68, at 687–88; Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2042–46.
102. For polls showing Catholic support for abortion rights, see Greenhouse & Siegel, supra
note 43, at 2058; Skerry, supra note 86, at 74.
103. See Ziegler, supra note 56, at 982–83 (discussing the period immediately after Roe).
104. See ZIEGLER, supra note 43. I rely here principally on one source and am therefore less
certain of this claim.
105. Congress did not seek to directly regulate abortion until it pursued a federal ban on
partial birth abortion in the 1990s, legislation vetoed by President Bill Clinton and eventually
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To start, the divide between Republicans and Democrats on
abortion and the related intransigence of interest groups has its
origins in the late 1970s—when the burgeoning conservative
movement and the Ronald Reagan presidential campaign
simultaneously pursued anti-abortion planks. Conservative interests
“mobilized against abortion in order to protect traditional family
roles.” 106 In particular, the so-called New Right “had begun to focus on
abortion as an issue around which to build party discipline in
Congress.” 107 The Republican Party and its presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan also saw conservatism in general, and abortion in
particular, as ways to strengthen the GOP through a basic
realignment of the parties. The ascendency of “Ronald Reagan’s GOP”
was linked to the defeat of the moderate-to-liberal wing of the
Republican Party. 108 Building on a political realignment in the South
tied to 1960s civil rights reforms, conservative “Southern Democrats”
became Southern Republicans. 109 Liberal “Rockefeller Republicans”
also defected to the Democratic Party. The result: the Republican
Party became more conservative and the Democratic Party more
liberal. 110 Correspondingly, Democrats and Republicans embraced
conflicting messages on issues that were intended to divide the
parties—abortion being one of them. 111
The 1980 election formally split Republicans and Democrats on
abortion. Reagan ran on a platform that “support[ed] . . . a
constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for
signed by George W. Bush in 2003. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Signs Ban On a Procedure
For Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/06/us/bush-signs-banon-a-procedure-for-abortions.html [https://perma.cc/UK7D-YXHE] (discussing the bill’s passage).
Starting in 1982, however, presidents have weighed in on the constitutionality of state abortion
procedures through amicus briefs filed by the Justice Department; starting in 1986, Republican
presidents have called for the overturning of Roe. See DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 109–11
(discussing the pro-life positions of the executive).
106. Post & Siegel, supra note 56, at 420.
107. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2061.
108. Kate O’Beirne, Rockefeller Republicans Take Manhattan, NAT’L. REV. (July 7, 2004,
8:39
AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/211389/rockefeller-republicans-takemanhattan-kate-obeirne [https://perma.cc/99CV-P7ET].
109. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 288–97 (2011) (discussing the effects of
disfranchisement on American politics).
110. See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI.
305, 306 (2003) (tracing the growth of Southern Republicans as a percentage of southern
lawmakers).
111. See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 217, 219–26 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001)
(discussing the message priorities of political parties).
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unborn children,” 112 proclaimed that Roe denied the “value of certain
human lives” and was as divisive and wrong as the decision in Dred
Scott, 113 pursued a range of pro-life regulatory initiatives, 114 and used
his appointments power to advance pro-life objectives, most notably,
the overturning of Roe. He pushed his Justice Department nominees
to call for the overturning of Roe, 115 and he nominated ardent Roe foe
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. 116
In Congress, a partisan abortion divide also began to emerge
around 1980. Up until 1979, the parties were generally in lockstep:
“Senate Republicans were split over abortion in about the same
proportion as House Democrats [and] looking across both chambers,
abortion was not a particularly partisan issue.” 117 1980 was the
beginning of the end of moderates in Congress (moderates made up
forty percent of Congress at that time as compared to five percent
today). 118 At the same time, the partisan divide—while growing—was
not vast. In 1980, 239 lawmakers filed an amicus brief backing
Congress’s appropriations power to withhold federal funds for
abortions but not other medical procedures; no member filed an
amicus brief on issues involving state regulatory authority until 1986,
and, in 1987, several Republican Senators joined a bipartisan coalition
to defeat Robert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination. 119 In other words,
the Roe to Casey period was one of emerging partisanship in Congress.

112. Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 15, 1980),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844
[https://perma.cc/F93Q-A3V8].
All
Republican platforms since 1980 have had strong anti-abortion planks and related calls “for the
appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the
sanctity of innocent human life.” Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Aug. 20, 1984), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845 [https://perma.cc/
M6ZN-6ARU].
113. RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 19 (1984).
114. For an inventory, see DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 97–120
115. It was widely reported that the appointment of Charles Fried to Solicitor General was
tied to Fried’s willingness to call for the overturning of Roe—a claim that Fried denies. For an
account, see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 161 (2004).
116. For an excellent overview of the Bork nomination, see ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR
JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989). For Bork’s views on the right to
privacy, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
117. Adams, supra note 73, at 723.
118. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Mar. 21, 2015),
http://voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm [https://perma.cc/R25W-3VGB] (mapping the
changes in Congressional polarization over time).
119. On congressional briefs, see Devins, supra note 79, at 946–48. On Bork, see BRONNER,
supra note 116, at 326–27.
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Partisanship had metastasized by the end of the period, but not until
then.
At the state level, there was no Democrat-Republican divide:
thirty-three states passed anti-abortion measures between 1973 and
1978; 120 forty-eight states had passed 306 abortion measures by
1989. 121 A survey of state legislation from 1973–1989 underscores the
absence of a partisan divide: 122 fifteen “challenger” states enacted
roughly half the laws, taking the lead “challenging” the boundaries of
Roe through the enactment of waiting periods, informed consent, and
other requirements; twelve “codifier” states rewrote their abortion
laws to conform to Roe but subsequently approved restrictions (i.e.,
funding, parental consent) that had been approved by the courts;
twelve “acquiescer” states largely steered clear of abortion; and nine
“supporter” states backed abortion rights through state funding and
greater access to abortion. A survey of each category of states over the
1973–1989 period reveals that there was not a clear pattern of states
in any category being dominated by Republicans or Democrats. 123 As
Table 1 reveals, challenger states included Illinois, Massachusetts,
and Minnesota; supporter states included Arkansas, Kansas, and New
Hampshire.

120. LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH FISKE KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 212 (1992)
121. DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 60.
122. This categorization of states is drawn from Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in
the Post-Webster Age, 20 PUBLIUS 27, 32–41 (1990).
123. See Supplemental Memorandum from Phil Giammona to Neal Devins on Roe to Casey
(Nov. 13, 2015) (on file with author) (summarizing research findings, including spreadsheet
detailing partisan composition of challenger and acquiescer states at different moments in time
between Roe and Casey).
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Table 1
Post-Roe Policymaking Approaches, 1973-1989
Challengers
ID (10)*
IL (15)
IN (9)
KY (13)
LA (12)
MA (11)
MN (11)
MO (13)
NB (9)
NV (9)
ND (16)
PA (14)
RI (9)
TN (11)
UT (14)

Codifiers
AZ (8)
CA (5)
FL (8)
GA (8)
ME (6)
MT (7)
OH (5)
OK (7)
SD (8)
VA (5)
WI (5)
WY (7)

Aquiescers
AL (2)
AR (4)
DE (4)
IA (4)
MD (4)
MI (3)
MS (3)
NJ (3)
NM (3)
NY (3)
NC (3)
SC (3)
TX (3)
WV (2)

Supporters
AK (0)
CO (1)
CT (0)
HI (1)
KS (1)
NH (1)
OR (1)
VT (1)
WA (1)

SOURCES: 1973-1980, Family Planning/Population Reporter; 19811989, "State Legislative Record-Fertility-Related Bills and Laws,"
published by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, Washington, D.C.
*Numbers in parentheses represent enactments. Hence, the table
does not reflect abortion battles that occurred before enactment, such
as close defeats, tabled bills, and sustained vetoes.

Consider too the very statute that was the subject of Casey: the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1989. The statute was enacted
by a majority Republican legislature with broad bipartisan support (it
passed the state House by a vote of 143 to 58 and Senate by a vote of
33 to 17); 124 it was signed into law by a pro-life Democratic governor,
Robert Casey. 125 The minority leader of the state Senate, Democrat
Robert Mellow, supported the measure and praised it because it “helps
124. See Stephen Drachler, Senate OKs Abortion Limits—Governor Expected to Sign Bill,
MORNING CALL (Nov. 15, 1989), http://articles.mcall.com/1989-11-15/news/2716296_1_barabortions-abortion-control-act-legal-abortions [http://perma.cc/N42T-EHKU] (discussing the
likely passage of the law); Robert Zausner, Pa. House OKs Limits on Abortion, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Oct.
25,
1989),
http://articles.philly.com/1989-10-25/news/26119333_1_anti-abortion-billabortion-foe-limit-abortion [http://perma.cc/277T-U9JN] (discussing the House’s passage of the
law).
125. See DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 73. When signing the measure, Casey spoke of
protecting “unborn life” and praised the state legislature for “speak[ing] forcefully” and not
“cutting and running.” Id.
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protect the rights of the unborn, the sanctity of life.” The Senate
majority leader, Republican Robert Jubilirer, opposed the measure as
inordinately restrictive, calling it “repugnant” and an unnecessary
intrusion on women’s rights.
The absence of a partisan divide reveals general voter attitudes
during the Roe to Casey period. General Social Surveys data as well as
Gallup polls reveal that Republicans were more supportive of abortion
rights at least until 1985 and probably until 1988. 126 Table 2 shows
nearly identical Democratic and Republican attitudes from 1975–
1988—when answering the question of whether abortion should be
legal under any circumstances.
Table 2

The Roe to Casey period was one of emerging partisan divisions
that were yet to manifest themselves with respect to state regulation
of abortion and, more generally, Democratic and Republican voters.
There are three features to this period worth highlighting, as they
suggest democratic deliberation on abortion was a real possibility and,
for reasons I will soon explain, that a minimalist decision would have
126. See Adams, supra note 73, at 731–32 (reporting tabulations based on General Social
Surveys data); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2070–71 (reviewing Gallup and other
data, concluding that attitudes started to diverge in 1988); Samantha Lucks & Michael
Salamone, Abortion, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 80, 98–99
(Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that Democrat and Republican attitudes started
to diverge in 1985).
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facilitated such discourse. First, most of the laws enacted were
politically popular, not divisive. States were not mandating that
women view ultrasounds or be told they would suffer psychological
harm if they terminated their pregnancies, nor seeking to shut down
abortion clinics by mandating that the clinics be mini-hospitals with
doctors who also have admitting privileges to nearby hospitals. 127
States, instead, were largely enacting widely popular laws that did not
directly contradict Roe: public funding, parental consent, informed
consent, waiting periods, hospital-only abortions. “Typically, more
than 85% of Americans approve a requirement that doctors provide
information about abortion alternatives to those seeking abortions,
and between 70 and 80% of Americans approve of a twenty-four-hour
waiting period and parental consent law.” 128 Second (and relatedly),
states did not challenge the Court’s authority. Decisions invalidating
politically popular responses to Roe were accepted as binding; with the
notable exception of Missouri (in 1989), states did not seek to overturn
Roe. 129 States argued that their legislation was a reasonable
regulation of maternal health—something that Roe specifically
approved. 130 Put another way: state action in the Roe to Casey period
sought to engage the judiciary in a dialogue on the sweep of abortion
rights. Third, the fact that an avalanche of abortion restrictions were
enacted may mean only that state legislatures saw no downside in
catering to pro-life interest groups, for pro-choice interests were
content to leave it to the courts to enforce abortion rights. 131 In other
127. I speak here of the vast majority of state laws. Some states enacted laws mandating
hospital only abortions; Louisiana and Utah would have effectively outlawed abortion. Devins,
Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1328. But there was a dramatic difference to the laws of this era
to the laws of the past five to seven years.
128. Lucks & Salamone, supra note 126, at 94.
129. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the state of Missouri argued that Roe was
such “a source of instability in the law that this Court should reconsider” and then “abandon” the
decision. Brief for Appellants at 9, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No.
88-605), 1989 WL 1127643, at *9. At the same time, Missouri did not double down and argue
that its statute could not be upheld without overturning Roe; the state, for example, sought to
treat the preamble to the statute (stating that life begins at conception) as nonbinding and hence
legally irrelevant—so that the Court could uphold the statute without overruling Roe. See id. at
*9, *21–22.
130. In Casey, for example, the state of Pennsylvania sought to distinguish its position
(upholding the law under Roe) from the position of the George H. Bush administration (calling
for Roe’s overturning). See Brief for Respondents, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551421, at *34–42; see also Brief for Appellants,
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495), 1985
WL 669698, at *49–52; Brief for Petitioner, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983) (Nos. 81-746 & 81-1172), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1503, at *45–57.
131. See DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 67–73; for additional discussion, see infra notes
135–142.
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words, rather than speak to extreme disapproval or political
instability, Roe arguably created position-taking opportunities for
lawmakers who would not be punished for enacting pro-life
legislation. 132
Roe, however, did not facilitate democratic deliberation. Its
absolutism proved a useful foil to conservative interests and, relatedly,
Republican party leadership. In particular, as Reagan Solicitor
General Charles Fried observed, the “Reagan administration made
Roe v. Wade the symbol of everything that had gone wrong in law,
particularly constitutional law.” 133 Correspondingly, Roe helped propel
party polarization: the New Right movement linked their support of
the Republican party to opposition to Roe; the Reagan administration
used it as a lever to make the Republican party more conservative and
more ideological. 134 Finally (and ironically), Roe stifled political
discourse by telling pro-choice interests that the Court had their back
and that they did not need to engage in grassroots battles (or dialogue)
with pro-life interests. Pro-choice interests, for example, admitted
they had been “lazy, complacent, and because of that caught off
guard” 135 when a plurality of the Court signaled in the 1989 Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services decision that the Court might reconsider
Roe, calling “the rigid Roe framework” unworkable. 136
The fallout following Webster provides a revealing if imperfect
glimpse as to the ways Roe distorted the political marketplace. In
particular, one-sided political discourse dominated by pro-life interests
gave way to an era where pro-choice forces were “going to take names
and kick ankles.” 137 In the years following Webster, pro-choice groups
132. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s
Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512–15 (2001) (discussing—in a far different context—
incentives for lawmakers to enact position taking legislation without regard to whether the
legislation will subsequently be invalidated). For this reason, state officials may have been
quietly pleased by the Roe decision. It relieved them of the responsibility of deciding the scope of
abortion rights and restrictions. Indeed, in his justly famous commentary on Roe, John Hart Ely
spoke of “the sighs of relief as this particular albatross was cut from the legislative and executive
necks.” John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973). Mark Graber
reaches the same conclusion in his article detailing why lawmakers sometimes seek cover in
court decisions. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35,
53–61 (1993).
133. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 72 (1991).
134. See id. (discussing New Right movement and Reagan administration efforts to
transform the Republican party).
135. CATHERINE WHITNEY, WHOSE LIFE? A BALANCED COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF ABORTION
FROM ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 126 (1991).
136. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989). The plurality also signaled
a new era of abortion politics by recognizing that “our holding today will allow some
governmental regulation of abortion that would have been prohibited under [Roe].” Id. at 521.
137. 135 Cong. Rec. 18170 (1989) (statement of Rep. AuCoin).
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experienced unprecedented growth in contributions and membership.
The National Abortion Rights Action League saw a four-fold increase
in membership and funding; 138 the number of pro-choice PACS
registered with the Federal Election Commission jumped from five in
1988 to fifteen in 1990. 139 Webster also proved a bonanza to pro-choice
politicians running against right-to-life candidates. 140 Perhaps more
telling, governors and legislators that had previously taken pro-life
positions either refused to pursue anti-abortion statutes or vetoed prolife legislation. 141 From 1989–1992, only fourteen statutes were
enacted, nine pro-choice and five pro-life. 142
One final comment about the Roe to Casey period: In the
decade following Roe, there was a real chance at dialogue and some
compromise between pro-choice and pro-life interests. As Mary Ziegler
notes in her study of this period, “polarization resulted neither
immediately nor inevitably from the Supreme Court’s [Roe] ruling.” 143
Some pro-choice advocates pursued a broader agenda, including family
planning, child care, sterilization abuse, workplace discrimination,
and health care. 144 Some abortion opponents also pursued a broader
agenda that likewise included workplace discrimination, contraception
funding, child care, and health care. 145 Indeed, pro-life and pro-choice
activists collaborated successfully in achieving protections for young
mothers and bans of discrimination on the basis of being pregnant,
with both sides “agree[ing] that true choice would require state
assistance.” 146

138. See Carol Matlack & Maya Weber, Abortion Lobbyists Striking a Vein of Gold, 11 NATL.
J. 632 (1991). Pro-life groups saw a modest increase in fundraising during the same period,
although fundraising by pro-life political action committees saw a slight decline during the 1989–
90 election cycle. See id.
139. See id.
140. Prominent examples include pro-choice gubernatorial candidates in Virginia (Doug
Wilder) and New Jersey (James Florio); in both races, the abortion issue shaped the campaign
and arguably proved decisive in the election. See DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 69–70.
141. The Florida legislature, for example, refused to pass a single abortion restriction in a
special session called a few days after the Webster decision by Governor Bob Martinez. See id. at
71. Governors in Idaho and Louisiana put aside their pro-life leanings and vetoed controversial
abortion restrictions enacted by state legislatures after Webster. See id. at 72–73.
142. NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 181 (2015).
143. ZIEGLER, supra note 43, at xv.
144. Id. at 128–56; see also Ziegler, supra note 56, at 973 (noting that some pro-choice
activists “supported some form of fetal rights, considering them in the larger context of debate
about medical ethics, human experimentation, and human dignity.”).
145. ZIEGLER, supra note 43, at 219–40. See also Ziegler, supra note 56, at 983–93 (noting a
pro-life push for maternity leave and other pro-life measures that facilitate reproductive choice).
146. Ziegler, supra note 56, at 982–83. For a modern day call for competing sides of the
abortion debate to seek common ground on issues involving wealth disparity, including child care
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Would a minimalist ruling in Roe have resulted in the
competing sides of the abortion debate seeking common ground or
pursuing compromise measures that recognized limited abortion
rights? There is no way to know. At the same time, however, it is quite
clear that Roe did not facilitate democratic deliberation. The decision
distorted the political marketplace and helped fuel a more
fundamental realignment in American politics. But Roe did not
instantaneously transform American or abortion politics. During the
Roe to Casey period, the abortion issue did not divide the states or the
American people; states adhered to Supreme Court authority over
abortion while pursuing broadly popular restrictions on abortion
rights. It may well be that the same measures would have been
pursued if the Court had issued a minimalist decision in 1973. The
difference would have been that the pursuit would not have been
shaped by a Supreme Court decision intended to facilitate, not shortcircuit, political discourse.
C. Casey and Beyond
In Casey, by substituting the minimalist undue burden
standards for the maximalist trimester test, the Court approved
waiting period and informed consent measures. The Court also
repudiated earlier decisions that had rigidly applied Roe to invalidate
these politically popular abortion restrictions. 147 Minimalist critics of
Roe point to the journey from Roe to Casey as proof positive that the
heroic Roe decision went too far and the Court should have pursued a
minimalist strategy all along. 148 For reasons just detailed, although a
minimalist decision would have better served democracy-enhancing
goals, the anti-Roe backlash theory is overstated. 149 In other words,
the Roe to Casey period shows that political context is as relevant as
the scope and sweep of judicial rulings in assessing backlash risks

and family planning, see Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: DeConstitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009).
147. Casey overturned City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986). Casey also approved a parental consent provision and recordkeeping and reporting
requirements. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878, 900 (1992).
148. See supra notes 43–47 (detailing criticisms of Roe going too far and focusing on
backlash risks and/or the benefits of political discourse).
149. See supra notes 120–146. Also, for reasons detailed previously, Roe contributed to, but
did not cause, the growing polarization between Democrats and Republicans. See also
Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2068 (arguing that political realignment was tied to
larger social forces and that post-Roe divisions are the consequence not cause of those forces).
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and, relatedly, whether a decision facilitates or undermines political
discourse.
The period after Casey reinforces this point. The success or
failure of Casey’s minimalism has more to do with the political
circumstances surrounding the decision than it does with the decision
itself. Following Casey, pro-choice and pro-life interests agreed on one
thing—that Casey would destabilize abortion politics, prompting
“dozens of new laws restricting abortion,” including “new legislative
models.” 150 That prediction matches the abortion conflagration that
started after the 2010 elections, but does not match the period from
Casey to 2010.
From 1992 to 2009, the post-Casey period can be seen as the
triumph of minimalism. For reasons I detailed in 2009, 151 Casey
seemed to stabilize state abortion politics. “The template of laws
approved by the Supreme Court in Casey were politically popular at
the time of Casey and remain politically popular today. Indeed, since
Pennsylvania has always been one of the most restrictive states when
it comes to abortion regulation, very few states are interested in
pushing the boundaries of what Casey allows. And while a handful of
outlier states have pushed the boundaries of what Casey allows, these
states (which account for a quite small percentage of abortions) have
largely worked within parameters set by the Court in Casey.” 152 The
Supreme Court too seemed sanguine with Casey; aside from its 2000
partial birth abortion decision, the Court did not address the scope of
state abortion authority since Casey (as compared to eleven Supreme
Court cases on this issue decided between Roe and Casey). 153
My 2009 accounting of the post-Casey period was not shared by
others. Dawn Johnsen, in particular, argued that I focused too much
on the laws states enacted post-Casey (which generally supported my
claim that the Casey template was guiding other states and therefore
promoting stability). She thought instead that the focus should be the
increasingly incendiary rhetoric of anti-abortion interests and the
corresponding rise in efforts (many of which were unsuccessful at that
time) to push the boundaries of Casey. 154 With the benefit of twenty150. Tamar Lewin, Long Battles Over Abortion Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, at A18.
151. Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1322.
152. Id. at 1318.
153. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), invalidated state partial birth bans. For a
listing of Supreme Court abortion rulings from Roe to Casey, see Major U.S. Supreme Court
Rulings on Reproductive Rights, LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE (2008), http://lsrj.org/
documents/factsheets/08-09_Supreme_Court_Rulings.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2ZK-RFJ2].
154. Johnsen initially took issue with aspects of what I wrote in a balkanization symposium
on abortion rights and elaborated on those comments in Dawn Johnsen, TRAPing Roe in Indiana
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twenty hindsight I think that criticism was fair, as I now think I
misperceived the direction of abortion politics at that time. So why did
the Casey compromise come undone, and what does this tell us about
the workability of judicial minimalism?
In this subpart, I will address these issues. Initially, I will
highlight how it was that, notwithstanding ever-growing polarization
between the parties, Casey was largely a stabilizing force until 2010. I
will then turn my sights to the recent wave of state legislative attacks
on abortion rights and explain why Casey’s minimalism no longer
facilitates stability or elected government discourse.
1. 1992–2009
To start, the 1992 to 2009 period was one of growing
polarization, including the rise of partisan divisions on social issues
like abortion. In Congress, the gap between Northern liberals and
Southern conservatives had been replaced by a sharp divide between
the parties. 155 Throughout the 1990s, this divide grew. By 2004,
measures of ideology revealed that the “two parties are [almost]
perfectly separated in their liberal-conservative ordering.” 156 By 2009,
the distance between the two parties was greater than at any other
time in the nation’s history. 157 Table Three illustrates this divide,
evaluating roll call votes in Congress.

and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356 (2009). For another critique of my
claims, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 89 (arguing that Roe was subsumed by larger social forces and
that the Roe backlash may speak less to the decision itself and more to those larger forces).
155. See Roberts & Smith, supra note 110, at 306.
156. For House and Senate rank orderings, see HOUSE_SORT10 Rank Ordering,
VOTEVIEW, http://voteview.com/HOUSE_SORT108.HTM (last visited May 10, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/D5AN-AK5P];
SENATE_SORT108
Rank
Ordering,
VOTEVIEW,
http://voteview.com/SENATE_SORT108.HTM (last visited May 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Q846YBAS]. See also THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION, supra note 63; Sean M. Theriault & David W.
Rohde, The Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. POL. 1011 (2011).
157. See Smith & Gamm, supra note 65, at 147, 151.
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Table 3 158

On abortion, the emerging divide between Republicans and
Democrats in Congress was fully cemented. Party-line voting on
judicial nominees, competing amicus briefs by large coalitions of
Democratic and Republican lawmakers, and the switching of political
parties (from Republican to Democrat) of anti-Bork Senator Arlen
Specter were hallmarks of this period. 159 Unlike earlier periods,
polarization also defined elite attitudes, and to a lesser extent, the
attitudes of the mass public.
“Elite status [no longer] trumped ideology and partisanship.” 160
2005 survey data by the Pew Research Group shows that the most
liberal Americans were affluent, well-educated Democrats and the
most conservative Americans were affluent, well-educated
Republicans. 161 These studies also highlight growing polarization
among elites, and, in particular, highlight dramatic changes among
strong political conservatives since the 1980s. In the 1980s,
158. For source information on this chart, see POLARIZED AMERICA, http://
polarizedamerica.com (last visited May 16, 2016). Chart information also available at VOTEVIEW,
http://voteview.com/HOUSE_SORT108.HTM (last visited May 10, 2016).
159. On party line voting, see Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice and Consent:
The Politics of Confirming Federal Judges in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 265 (Lawrence C. Dodd
and Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 10th ed. 2013). On competing amicus briefs, see Devins, supra
note 79, at 946–50, 1005–15. On Specter’s switch, see Carl Hulse, Specter Switches Parties, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr 28, 2009), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/specter-will-run-as-ademocrat-in-2010 [https://perma.cc/6FGR-ELRJ].
160. Graber, supra note 68, at 688.
161. The Pew Study correlates income and education to political beliefs. See The 2005
Political Typology, PEW RES. CTR. (May 10, 2005), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacypdf/242.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK3D-8HF9].
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conservatives divided into two groups—social conservatives and
economic conservatives (who were often socially moderate or liberal);
by 2005, economic conservatives had adopted the cultural beliefs of
social conservatives. 162 Liberal Democrats too became more liberal,
especially on social issues. Polling on same-sex marriage, abortion
rights, and civil liberties showed that members of the most affluent
and well-educated Democrats were “far more liberal” than other
Democrats. 163
Public opinion polls also revealed a growing public divide
between Democrats and Republicans on abortion. Beginning around
1990, Republicans and Democrats began to diverge, and that
divergence continued throughout the post-Casey period. Table Two
traces that divergence on the question of whether abortion should be
legal under any circumstances; Table Four shows that there is a
similar divergence on health-related abortions. Moreover, by 2008, “if
pollsters ask if someone is strongly pro-choice, strongly pro-life, or
only somewhat committed to one of the positions, 70% of the public
identify with one of the two poles.” 164
Table 4
Support for Legal Abortion by Party Identification 165

162. Id. at 53.
163. Graber, supra note 68, at 698.
164. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 5 (2010) (collecting
polling data).
165. For source information on this chart, see Luks & Salamone, supra note 126.
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At the state level, changing attitudes on moral issues
implicating family structure and gender roles became increasingly
salient. 166 Republican-dominated red states had different policies and
norms than Democrat-dominated blue states. In the aftermath of the
2004 presidential election, researchers observed that “those first-day
stories about moral values—and the red-and-blue maps that went
with them—conveyed something real”; 167 indeed, the leading academic
study of this topic was titled Red Families v. Blue Families. 168
On abortion, there were certainly differences between red and
blue states before 2010. 169 At the same time, Casey largely stabilized
abortion politics. There were relatively few laws passed during this
period, especially the first several years following Casey. 170 More
significant, lawmakers in Republican-dominated states largely
acquiesced to the template of abortion restrictions enacted by
Pennsylvania and approved by the Supreme Court in Casey. By 2009,
twenty-four states had waiting period laws, thirty-three states had
informed consent laws, and forty-three states had parental consent or
notice laws. 171 There are three principal related explanations for this
acquiescence: First, the Pennsylvania template matched both public
opinion and the preferences of most pro-life states. 172 Pennsylvania
was ranked by the National Abortion Rights Action League as among

166. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Purple America, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 107 (Spring
2006).
167. John C. Green & Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, RELIGION IN THE NEWS
(Spring 2005). State office holders did not track the red state-blue state presidential divide until
after 2010; before 2010, around half of all states had some form of divided Republican-Democrat
government. After 2010, states became purely red or blue. For a discussion of both the changing
face of state politics and its impact on state abortion laws, see infra notes 185–251 and
accompanying text.
168. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 164, at 19 (discussing differences in family strategies in
predominantly Republican and Democratic states).
169. See id. at 92–105.
170. See DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 74 (“[S]tate responses to Casey reinforce the . . .
trend of diminishing state intervention in abortion. Most strikingly, according to Alan
Guttmacher Institute studies, ‘antiabortion legislators [have] heeded . . . [Casey] and curtailed
their attempts to make abortion illegal.’ In 1994, for example, no legislation was introduced to
outlaw abortion.”).
171. GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief, The Impact of State Mandatory Counseling
and
Waiting
Period
Laws
on
Abortion:
A
Literature
Review
1
(2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MandatoryCounseling.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8V3-XZXJ];
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION
RIGHTS 19 (18th ed. 2009); see also DEVINS, SHAPING, supra note 9, at 74 (noting that focus of
state legislatures after Casey was enactment of laws upheld in Casey).
172. See supra notes 124–125 (documenting public support for Pennsylvania’s restrictions
on abortion).
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the seven most restrictive states regarding abortion 173—so, very few
states were interested in enacting restrictions more stringent than
Pennsylvania. Second, Republican lawmakers were not interested in
being foot soldiers (or even officers) in the abortion wars. Public
opinion (which also includes the forty-two percent of voters who
consider themselves independent) had been fairly stable and
supported limited abortion rights, not the evisceration of abortion
rights. 174 Moreover, lawmakers at that time generally sought to steer
clear of divisive controversy. As one lawmaker described the Ohio
House of Representatives: “There are ten strong pro-choice people, ten
strong pro-life, and 79 legislators who would rather the issue would go
away.” 175 Third, as was true in the Roe to Casey period, lawmakers in
most states preferred to operate within boundaries set by the Supreme
Court. 176 Indeed, no state pursued the spousal notification provision
struck down in Casey—a politically popular provision that
undoubtedly would have been enacted in a great many states if it had
been upheld in Casey. 177
The one notable exception to this pattern is partial-birth
abortion, and it is the exception that proves the rule. With polls
showing only seventeen percent of people thinking partial-birth
abortions should be legal, 178 thirty-two states passed such bans
between 1995 and the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision invalidating the
Nebraska ban. 179 Following the 2000 decision, no state enforced its
ban. More strikingly, neither Samuel Alito joining the Court in 2006
nor the Supreme Court’s approval of a federal partial-birth ban in

173. NARAL, supra note 171, at tbl.. Pennsylvania was also a handful of so-called challenger
states in the Roe to Casey period—leading the charge in enacting abortion restrictions. See supra
tbl. 1.
174. See Luks & Salamone, supra note 126, at 101; GALLUP, In Depth: Topics A to Z:
Abortion,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/Abortion.aspx?
[https://perma.cc/6UB7-TJWE]
(highlighting fact that Americans have believed from the time of Roe to 2008 that abortion
should be legal with restrictions).
175. Graber, supra note 132, at 58. See id. for additional examples. See also supra notes
129–132.
176. See supra notes 129–130.
177. Sixty-nine percent of the public supported this provision but nevertheless no state
pursued such a provision after Casey. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1346 n.122.
178. Clinton and Giuliani Seen as Not Highly Religious; Romney’s Religion Raises Concerns,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/09/06/clinton-and-giuliani-seen-asnot-highly-religious-romneys-religion-raises-concerns [https://perma.cc/6DHB-EWSW].
179. For a listing of states with bans, see Bans on “Partial Birth” Abortion, GUTTMACHER
INST.
(Jan.
1,
2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W28Z-5RG9].
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2007 impacted overall state legislation restricting abortion rights. 180
The Casey compromise seemed intact in 2009.
At the same time, party polarization was growing, and the
Casey compromise was increasingly fragile. Pro-life interests were
pushing for more draconian restrictions and a handful of outlier states
were pushing the boundaries of what Casey allowed. 181 In 2009, these
states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota) accounted for less than three percent of
abortions. 182 The laws they were enacting, moreover, were not being
pursued by other states: mandatory ultrasounds, fetal pain laws, and
informed consent laws that talked about suicide risks or a link
between abortion and breast cancer. 183 In 2009, I discounted these
outlier states—concluding that they were true outliers and not
changing the content of the abortion debate. 184 That assessment
proved incorrect. Changes in state legislatures starting around 2010
transformed abortion politics yet again. For the balance of this section,
I will detail these changes, showing that the Casey compromise no
longer holds and that democratic deliberation on abortion rights is no
longer possible.
2. 2010–2015
Three interrelated phenomena undid the Casey compromise
after the 2010 elections. First, there was a rapid rise in party
polarization. With the advent of the Tea Party, Republicans became
noticeably more conservative and more willing to push the boundaries
of their preferred policies. 185 Correspondingly, Democrats became
180. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1324. Alito joining the Court was
consequential because he replaced Sandra Day O’Connor—the Justice who cast the deciding vote
in the 5-4 decision invalidating state bans on partial birth abortion. See Linda Greenhouse,
Consistently, A Pivotal Role: Groundbreaking Justice Held Balance of Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2005, at A10. The Supreme Court’s approval of the federal ban was consequential because the
Court signaled a new willingness to uphold abortion bans. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and The
Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1700–01
(2008); Dahlia Lithwick, Father Knows Best: Dr. Kennedy's Magic Prescription for Indecisive
Women, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2007, 7:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2007/04/father_knows_best.2.html [https://perma.cc/2S8Y-DBHE].
181. Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1338.
182. Based on data representing the number of legal abortions in each state in 2005, these
states collectively account for 2.94% of U.S. abortions. Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost,
Trends in the Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974 to 2004, GUTTMACHER INST.
18–19 (2008), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/09/23/TrendsWomenAbortions-wTables.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQ5W-JR5A].
183. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1338–49.
184. See id. at 1339–40.
185. See infra notes 191–214 and accompanying text.
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more liberal and a growing number of independents left both parties.
Second, there was a stronger identity with one party or the other
when voting. Republican voters rarely crossed over to vote Democratic
and vice-versa; relatedly, there was less incentive for elected officials
to compromise and greater incentive to pursue agendas that would
appeal to the party faithful who voted in primaries. 186 One inevitable
outgrowth of this was that Republicans and Democrats would be more
ideological in both their agenda and their refusal to compromise. 187
Third, with voters gravitating to one party or the other, state
legislatures tended to be controlled similarly. In the post-2010 period,
this proved a boon to the Republican Party. 188
The consequence of all this was both a spike up in the number
of Republican-controlled states and a stronger commitment among
Republican officeholders to aggressively pursue a conservative
agenda, including the pursuit of a broad array of pro-life measures.
Before turning to these measures, let me provide some additional
details of the dramatic changes that took place after the 2010
elections—as these details put into focus why Casey-like minimalism
is unsuited to today’s political environment. To start, the ideological
gap between Republicans and Democrats grew at an exponential rate
starting around 2004. The median Republican is now more
conservative than nearly all Democrats (ninety-four percent), and the
median Democrat is more liberal than ninety-two percent of
Republicans. 189 This is compared to 2004 levels of ideological division,
when the median Republican was more conservative than only sixtyeight percent of Democrats, and the median Democrat was more
liberal than seventy percent of Republicans. 190 The rate of polarization
jumped between 2004 and 2014, while staying fairly steady between
1994 and 2004. 191 Specifically, an increased twenty-two percent of
Republicans became more conservative than the median Democrat
between 2004 and 2014, along with the liberalization of an additional
twenty-six percent of Democrats over the same period. 192
A contributing factor to the rightward movement of
Republicans (voters and elected officials alike) on social issues is the
186. See infra notes 202–203, 209–211.
187. Abortion is a prime example. See infra notes 218–249 and accompanying text.
188. See infra Table 6.
189. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideological-consistency/#interactive
[https://perma.cc/S24B-Y2GA].
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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rise of the Tea Party. 193 What initially started as an economic
movement swept up conservatives across the board, including the
Religious Right. 194 Eighty-five percent of Tea Party supporters (as
compared to twenty-nine percent of non-supporters) describe
themselves as conservative. 195 A 2010 poll conducted by the Public
Religion Research Institute found that about half of Tea Party
members identified as part of the Religious Right and another
Washington Post poll found that most white evangelicals supported
the movement. 196 On abortion, sixty percent of Tea Party members
think that abortion should be illegal (as compared to nineteen percent
of the general population). 197 With Tea Party members
disproportionately voting in party primaries, 198 Republican nominees
are often social conservatives committed to the evisceration of
abortion rights. 199
The increasing conservatism of Republicans is evidenced in
other important ways. Republicans have seen significant increases in
support from pro-life religious groups: Evangelicals (five percent
increase between 2008 and 2012), Mormons (twelve percent increase),
and Catholics (eight percent and moved from majority Democrat to

193. The rise of the Tea Party is often linked to Republicans becoming more conservative—
especially in state elections—starting in 2010. See Louis Jacobson, Welcome to the Tea Party, 37
STATE LEG., Sept. 2011, at 12.
194. See Michelle Boorstein, Tea Party, Religious Right Often Overlap, Poll Shows, WASH.
POST (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/05/
AR2010100501491.html [https://perma.cc/H5C3-GUK8]; Alan I. Abramowitz, Partisan
Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement, at 11, http://faculty.washington.edu/
jwilker/353/AbramowitzTea.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3D3-WWVH] (demonstrating tea party as a
haven for religious conservatives).
195. See Abramowitz, supra note 194, at 10.
196. See Boorstein, supra note 194.
197. See Jon Brand, Tea Party: Libertarian Revolt or Religious Right in Disguise?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0421/Teaparty-Libertarian-revolt-or-religious-right-in-disguise [https://perma.cc/LV9B-FB2N]; see also
Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol & John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of
Republican Conservatism, 9 PERSP. ON POL., Mar. 2011, at 25–43, (stating that the Tea Party
movement deems the regulation of abortion clinics as morally necessary).
198. Alec Tyson, Tea Party Republicans Exert Stronger Influence in GOP Primaries, PEW
RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/07/tea-partyrepublicans-exert-stronger-influence-in-gop-primaries/
[https://perma.cc/K7B9-N6XX].
One
prominent example of this phenomenon is the 2012 Texas Senate race. At that time, Ted Cruz
was an upstart backed by the Tea Party; Tea Party support in the Republican primary was
critical to Cruz. See Manny Fernandez, Ted Cruz’s Senate Bid That Didn’t Stop At The Senate,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/us/politics/ted-cruz-firstcampaign.html [https://perma.cc/BTN9-WM9J].
199. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When
“Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
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majority Republican). 200 On the abortion issue, Democratic elected
officials are uniformly pro-choice and Republicans pro-life. There are
only four “pro-life” identifying Democrats at the federal level and 122
at the state level, or about 1.7% and 4% of elected Democrats
respectively. 201 Pro-choice Republicans are almost as rare with seven
elected at the federal level (2.3%) and anecdotal evidence suggesting
next-to-no pro-life Republicans at the state level. 202
Just as Republicans are moving to the right, Democrats are
moving to the left—so that there no longer are moderate elected
officials. As noted earlier, party polarization had eviscerated moderate
Congressman and Senators by around 2010. 203 At the state level,
“voters are increasingly being offered candidates who are either very
liberal or conservative in elections, and there are far fewer moderates
that we used to see win.” 204 A study of state legislature roll call votes
from 1996 to 2013 reaches the same conclusion: Democrats have
moved to the left and Republicans to the right. 205 In Republicancontrolled states, moreover, the ideological gap between median
legislators is narrowing—suggesting greater ideological conformity

200. Trends in Party Identification of Religious Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/02/02/trends-in-party-identification-of-religious-groups/
[https://perma.cc/2GFF-HTWM] (from 2008 to 2014, the gap between Republicans and
Democrats who consider themselves very religious increased from 4% to 14%).
201. DEMOCRATS FOR LIFE OF AMERICA, Elected Pro-Life Democrats (Oct. 25, 2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20151004041436/http:/democratsforlife.org/index.php/big-tent/
elected-pro-life-dems/pro-life-democrats [https://perma.cc/REA8-CC32].
202. Republicans For Choice, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikpedia.org/wiki/Republicans-for-Choice
[https://perma.cc/5E48-Z9SS] (federal list). At the state level, the rarity of pro-choice Republicans
prompted Salon to title a profile of a pro-choice Republican lawmaker. Katie McDonough, Yes,
Pro-Choice Republicans Are Real!, SALON (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/12/
yes_pro_choice_republicans_are_real/ [https://perma.cc/Q5V6-HNDQ].
203. See supra notes 154–162.
204. Valerie Richardson, Is One-Party Rule Dividing America? Concentration of Power Can
Lead to Overreach, Backlash, WASH. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2013/jun/27/one-party-rule-in-states-is-dividing-america/?page=all [https://perma.cc/PY5DG4EV] (quoting political scientist Seth Masket).
205. See Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures,
105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530, 546 (2011); Boris Shor, How U.S. State Legislatures are Polarized
and Getting More Polarized, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarizedin-2-graphs/ [https://perma.cc/HS8G-6BR2]; Ana Swanson, These Political Scientists May Have
Discovered Why U.S. Politics Are a Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/07/these-political-scientists-may-havediscovered-the-real-reason-u-s-politics-are-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/57MD-PMWH]; John
Voorheis, Nolan McCarty & Boris Shor, Unequal Incomes, Ideology, and Gridlock (Aug. 21,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649215
[https://perma.cc/Y4KXFFRP].
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power to conservative party loyalists who vote in party primaries.
Correspondingly, while there are fewer Democratic states, those states
are more solidly under Democratic control: Connecticut, California,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Mexico. 211 The inevitable
outgrowth of this bifurcation is that states tend to be controlled by one
party or the other, that that party is more likely now than ever before
to hold a super-majority in the legislature and the governorship, and
that party is likely to be the Republican party. 212 In 2015, there were
twenty-three single-party Republican states (where Republicanscontrolled the legislature and governorship) and seven single-party
Democratic states. 213
The most visible effects of Republican gains are Republican
efforts to “gain partisan advantage” by “eviscerat[ing] liberal policies”
and “entrench[ing] the political power of the right.” 214 Abortion
regulation is key to this effort as are voter identification laws, tax
reform, and the elimination of public sector unions. 215 On abortion,
there have been dramatic changes both in the number of laws enacted,
and in the severity of state restrictions. From 2011 to 2013, 205
abortion restrictions were enacted—a dramatic increase from the
2001–2010 decade, when 189 restrictions were enacted. In 2015, fiftyseven restrictions were enacted. According to the Alan Guttmacher
Institute, thirteen states were hostile towards abortion in 2000; in
2010, the number was twenty-two with five considered very hostile; in
2014, twenty-seven states were considered hostile and eighteen very
hostile. 216
The types of laws have also changed. Before 2009, one state
(Oklahoma) mandated that a woman undergo an ultrasound before
211. See id.
212. See Louis Jacobson, The Year of Single Party Control and Supermajorities,
GOVERNING.COM (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/politics/gov-year-single-partycontrol-supermajorities.html [https://perma.cc/GC5C-5AKT].
213. State and Legislative Partisan Composition Post-Election, NCSL.ORG (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2015_Post_Election12_16_4pm
.pdf [https://perma.cc/REV9-VSTT].
214. Thomas B. Edsell, The State-by-State Revival of the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/opinion/the-state-by-state-revival-of-the-right.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9SP3-QX4X]. Democrats too seek partisan advantage in the states that they
control. New York and Maryland Democrats passed gun control legislation in 2013 over fierce
Republican opposition. See Louis Jacobson, Are States Deepening the Nation’s Red-Blue Divide?,
GOVERNING.COM (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/politics/gov-states-deepeningnations-red-blue-divide.html [https://perma.cc/ZW59-CNJX].
215. See Edsell, supra note 214.
216. In Just the Last Four Years, States Have Enacted 231 Abortion Restrictions,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2015/01/05/
[https://perma.cc/MZ9P-VJEJ].
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obtaining an abortion and that the provider must show and describe
the image to the woman. Four other states have now enacted similar
legislation (Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin). 217 States
have also ratcheted up waiting period lengths (three states—Alabama,
Arizona, Tennessee—now have forty-eight-hour waiting periods and
five others—Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah—have seventy-two-hour waiting periods);
seventeen states now require that require women be told of a link
between abortion and breast cancer and/or negative psychological
effects of abortion and/or that the abortion procedure is painful to the
fetus. 218 Few of these measures were in place in 2009. 219
The most dramatic changes involve two sets of laws enacted
after 2009 220—hospital admitting privileges (eleven states) and
twenty-week abortion bans (twelve states). 221 Admitting privilege laws
are draconian in their effect, as revealed in litigation involving
Mississippi (where the only clinic would have shut down), Texas
(where around two-thirds of abortion clinics would shut down), and
Wisconsin (where two of the state’s four abortion clinics would shut
down). 222 Proponents of these laws were well aware of their
consequences: Mississippi governor Phil Bryant spoke of the state
doing “an admirable job” protecting the unborn and that his “goal is to
end abortion in Mississippi.” 223 In Texas, state lieutenant governor
David Dewhurst—when the bill was under consideration—tweeted a
photo showing abortion clinics likely to close under the bill, writing:
“We fought to pass SB5 thru the Senate last night, & this is why!” 224
217. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 10,
2015),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NW5Q2BCM].
218. See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1,
2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NW5Q2BCM].
219. See Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of State Mandatory Counseling and
Waiting Period Laws on Abortion: A Literature Review, GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MandatoryCounseling.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK96-642R].
220. See Sarah Kiff, The Landscape of Abortion Bans, in One Must-see Map, WASH. POST
(Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/28/the-landscape-ofabortion-bans-in-one-must-see-map/ [https://perma.cc/7855-VAX2].
221. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 216. Before 2009, several states banned abortions
after viability and some at 24 weeks. See id.
222. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 23–24.
223. Mississippi State of State Address, C-SPAN (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.cspan.org/video/?317373-1/mississippi-state-state [https://perma.cc/6SMA-8SFY]. For similar
statements by bill sponsor Sam Mims, see M.J. Lee, Bill Dooms Only Miss. Abortion Clinic,
POLITICO.COM (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74871 [https://perma.cc/
HNF3-3WUT].
224. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43, at 24.
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Twenty-week bans are largely symbolic (ninety-nine percent of
abortions take place earlier in the pregnancy), 225 but are telling
nonetheless. Although Casey’s minimalist undue burden standard
gave states substantial leeway to experiment, 226 Casey formally set
viability (roughly twenty-four weeks) as the point at which states
might ban abortion; 227 the twenty-week ban—based on disputed
claims about fetal pain 228—is flatly inconsistent with Casey. For the
first time, 229 a substantial number of states are doing more than
testing boundaries: they are acting in direct contradiction of Supreme
Court dictates and, as such, these laws are testament to the
ascendency of the “aggressive wing of the antiabortion movement.” 230
The changing face of abortion politics is about more than the
increasing willingness of states to place substantial restrictions on
women seeking abortions and abortion clinics; 231 it is also about the
225. See Kliff, supra note 74.
226. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1329 (arguing that pro-life Justices could
uphold virtually any law a state is likely to enact under Casey). Indeed, federal courts of appeal
were divided on the constitutionality of admitting privileges laws that shut down most state
abortion clinics. See Greenhouse & Siegel supra note 43, at 38.
227. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
228. See Pam Belluc, Complex Science at Issue in Politics of Fetal Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/complex-science-at-issue-in-politics-of-fetalpain.html [https://perma.cc/F77C-DGKW].
229. See supra notes 129–132 (noting how lawmakers did not challenge Roe before Casey);
supra notes 169–177 (noting lawmaker acquiescence to Casey before 2009).
230. Sarah Kliff, What North Dakota’s Six Week Abortion Ban Says About the Antiabortion
Movement, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/
15/what-north-dakotas-6-week-abortion-ban-says-about-the-antiabortion-movement/
[https://perma.cc/Y3N2-H7F2]. Given Casey’s clear holding, no lower court has upheld a twentyweek ban. See Recent Abortion Ban Litigation, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/PreviabilityLitigation-With-Chart-for-Sept-20-week-ban%20vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKR4-GSCX]. For
news stories discussing how pro-life legislation increasingly caters to advocates of more assertive
restrictions, see Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Pushes New Abortion Limits to Appease Vocal Base,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/politics/undaunted-by-2012elections-republicans-embrace-anti-abortion-agenda.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5NVD-PBHR];
Molly Redden, Pro-Lifers Aren’t Even Trying to Make Abortion Restrictions Sound Nice Anymore,
THE NEW REPUB. (Aug. 27, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/ article/114480/abortion-laws-withoutrape-exceptions-are-proliferating [https://perma.cc/2BRK-DX7Y].
231. I have highlighted some but hardly all of the ways that states are now regulating
abortion. Other examples include banning an established drug protocol for medication abortions
and requiring abortion clinics to meet the same building, equipment, and staffing standards as
ambulatory surgical facilities. See Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WAS-UCPT];
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV74-L2ET]; see
also Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Put
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1 (Winter
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.html [https://perma.cc/E5EA-K5YH];
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way in which these laws are passed—ways that cast doubt on the
democracy-enhancing benefits of minimalist decision making.
Specifically, party-line voting, interest group capture, and the
manipulation of the lawmaking process are part and parcel of abortion
politics today—all of which are anathema to democratic discourse.
Most significantly and most obviously, abortion now divides the
parties in ways that stand against compromise and deliberation across
parties or within parties. Consequently, just as Democrats usually
stand together in deep-blue states to pursue gun control legislation, 232
Republicans similarly stand together on abortion. 233 Examples
abound. 234 In 2015, North Carolina Republicans passed a seventy-twohour waiting period requirement on a party-line vote—ignoring
complaints from Democrats that there was no evidence that the bill
served women’s health interests. 235 The Florida state Senate took one
hour to approve a twenty-four-hour waiting period, rejecting all eight
Democratic amendments; the straight party-line vote was described as

Lydia DePillis, States Are Passing Hundreds of New Abortion Restrictions, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2015/01/09/states-are-passinghundreds-of-new-abortion-restrictions-heres-what-its-like-to-operate-in-one-of-them/
[https://perma.cc/PUS2-V9UD]; Eric Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/us/women-losingaccess-to-abortion-as-opponents-gain-ground-in-state-legislatures.html [https://perma.cc/28VRRUG5].
232. See Jacobson, supra note 212 (discussing Democrat party-line voting in New York and
Maryland).
233. Democrats too stand together on abortion. For example, Democrats back the movement
to allow nurse practitioners to perform abortions in the first months of pregnancy. In 2013,
California passed such legislation on a nearly party-line vote. See Associated Press, Bill Would
Let Non-Physicians Perform Abortions, CBS LOS ANGELES (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2013/08/26/bill-would-let-non-physicians-perform-abortions/
[https://perma.cc/2RK8-QFNU].
234. While party line voting dominates, there are a handful of counterexamples. Several
North Dakota Republicans opposed fetal heartbeat legislation (that would ban abortions after six
weeks), Kentucky Democrats joined Republicans in backing mandatory ultrasound legislation,
and West Virginia Democrats joined Republicans in supporting fetal pain legislation. See
HB1456 - Prohibits Abortion If Fetal Heartbeat Is Detected - Key Vote, VOTESMART.ORG,
http://votesmart.org/bill/16253/45648/prohibits-abortions-if-fetal-heartbeat-isdetected#.VpL8dJMrJsM (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WF4F-G5NM ]; Johnny
Turner’s Voting Record on Abortion, VOTESMART.ORG, http://votesmart.org/candidate/keyvotes/35125/johnny-turner/2/abortion#.VpL8IJMrJsM
(last
visited
Apr.
5,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/4LYN-VXTH];
West
Virginia
House
Bill
2568,
LEGISCAN.COM,
https://legiscan.com/WV/bill/HB2568/2015 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F5QDTYFA].
235. See
North
Carolina
House
of
Representatives,
NCLEG.GOV,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2015&sChamber
=H&RCS=682 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ST6P-9VG7] (House of Representatives
vote); see also North Carolina House Bill 465, LEGISCAN.COM, https://legiscan.com/NC/rollcall/
H465/id/453448 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/U9ZV-N5H3] (Senate Vote).
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“emotional” and lasted all of one hour. 236 Wisconsin passed a twentyweek abortion ban in 2015 without the support of a single
Democrat. 237 Arkansas Republicans voted as a block to override
Democratic Governor Mike Bebee’s 2013 veto of human heartbeat
legislation that would outlaw most abortions after twelve weeks. 238 In
Idaho, Democrats proposed an amendment to 2015 legislation
requiring a pregnant woman to undergo an in-person exam and
counseling before being allowed to undergo a chemical abortion. The
amendment, intended to highlight that Republicans were not
interested in maternal health, would have imposed safety standards
on the chemical prescription; the amendment was turned down on a
straight party-line vote. 239
Beyond party-line voting, Republican lawmakers increasingly
look to pro-life interest groups when drafting abortion measures.
Indeed, by making use of model legislation drafted by Americans
United for Life (AUL), 240 lawmakers essentially shut off democratic
discourse and put into place the legislative priorities of a single set of
interests. Specifically, AUL has put together a self-described
“playbook” containing forty-four model bills, bills “developed by AUL
legal experts to assist legislators and policymakers in drafting,
236. Brendan Farrigan, Bill Passes Senate 26-13: Abortion Waiting Period Measure Goes to
Scott, THE LEDGER (Apr. 24, 2015), www.theledger.com/article/20150424/POLITICS/1504296333;
see also Senate Poised to Approve Abortion Waiting Period Bill, CBS MIAMI (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/04/23/senate-poised-to-approve-abortion-waiting-period-bill/
[https://perma.cc/Y5UZ-8W73]. Florida is not alone; Michigan lawmakers moved at similar
breakneck speed in 2013 when considering a bill that would prohibit insurers from paying for
abortions. The measure was brought up by Republican House and Senate leadership just after
4:00 PM and was voted on in both chambers by 5:20 PM. See Jonathan Oosting, Michigan
Legislature Approves Controversial Abortion Insurance Bill, MICHIGAN LIVE (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/michigan_legislature_approves_1.html
[https://perma.cc/28L8-VW5Y].
237. See Scott Walker Signs Anti-Abortion Bill into Law, WISC. GAZETTE (July 20, 2015),
http://wisconsingazette.com/2015/07/20/scott-walker-signs-anti-abortion-bill-into-law/
[https://perma.cc/X5MZ-7LQF].
238. See Corrie MacLaggan, Arkansas Senate Votes to Override Veto of Bill Limiting
Abortion, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-usa-abortionarkansas-idUSBRE92413820130305 [https://perma.cc/5WNH-XWZZ].
239. See George Prentice, Idaho House GOP Approves Chemical Abortion Restrictions, BOISE
WEEKLY (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.boiseweekly.com/CityDesk/archives/2015/03/02/idaho-housegop-approves-chemical-abortion-restrictions [https://perma.cc/DQ9L-6K8G].
240. AUL describes itself as a “pro-life legal team” that works in legislative processes to
create and “enforce pro-life laws.” About, AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/aboutaul/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LGD4-2NBM]. For overview treatments of AUL
and its efforts, see Emily Bazelon, Charmaine Yoest’s Cheerful War on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/magazine/charmaine-yoests-cheerfulwar-on-abortion.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GL87-UP3B]; Olga Khazan, Planning the End of
Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/
what-pro-life-activists-really-want/398297/ [https://perma.cc/8U4W-9Y3J].
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debating, and passing life-affirming laws.” 241 In 2012–2013, AUL
claims it received 2,500 requests for model legislation; 242 AUL assisted
states in passing many of the forty-five abortion restrictions enacted
in 2013, and it provided model language for twenty-eight state laws
enacted in 2011. 243 In 2014, legislators from several states specifically
acknowledged AUL’s role in passing legislation that restricts abortion
overages in state-funded health care exchanges. 244 A recent study of
this “opt out” legislation found that the AUL model served as the
primary text for laws in six states; 245 specifically, after AUL provides
the model legislation to state lawmakers, the act is then transcribed
into an official bill that is largely passed intact. 246
Expedited hearings, streamlined debates, and other procedural
moves to avoid traditional legislative processes are a third and—for
my purposes—final measure of post-2010 lawmaker disinterest in
engaging in any kind of dialogue over the scope of abortion rights. In
Ohio, only proponents spoke at 2015 hearings regarding a bill that
would prohibit abortion solely as a result of a Down Syndrome test; 247
241. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2013: DECONSTRUCTING ROE:
ABORTION’S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WOMEN xv (2013), http://www.aul.org/featured-images/AUL1301_DL13%20Book_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/29W3-JRVW]. This “playbook” includes model
legislation for twenty-week bans, informed consent laws, parental involvement laws, regulations
of abortion facilities and providers, defunding abortion providers, and other issues.
242. Id. at x.
243. See Eliza Gray, The Saleswoman, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/102119/aul-abortion-yoest-pro-life-virginia
[https://perma.cc/FQ5Q-LLCX] (2011 statistics); Julie Hirschfield Davis, ‘Roe v Wade’ Is State
Anti-Abortion Laws’ Ultimate Target, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 11, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-11/roe-v-dot-wade-is-state-anti-abortion-lawsultimate-target [https://perma.cc/6EUR-9CAT] (2013 statistics).
244. See Kristin N. Garrett & Joshua M. Jansa, Interest Group Influence in Policy Diffusion
Networks, 15 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 1, 8 (2015), http://spa.sagepub.com/content/early/
2015/07/02/1532440015592776.full.pdf?ijkey=B3bH3mS18kUNLzg&keytype=finite
[https://perma.cc/U2LG-Q4EM].
245. The six states are Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Nebraska. See
Erica Hellerstein, Inside the Highly Sophisticated Group That’s Quietly Making It Much Harder
to Get an Abortion, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/12/02/
3597770/americans-united-life-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/P4HY-FS8E].
246. This is precisely what happened in Oklahoma where only ten words were changed to
the model bill’s language. See id. For another example of AUL working with state lawmakers to
enact a “cut and paste model bill” drafted by AUL, see Davis, supra note 243 (discussing AUL
work with North Dakota state senator Bette Grande).
247. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 135 Before Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 131st
General Assembly (Ohio 2015), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/committee/community-and-familyadvancement [https://perma.cc/YW8C-BLT3]; Leah Barkouskis, Ohio Committee Passes Bill to
(June
17,
2015),
Ban
Abortions
Based
on
Down
Syndrome,
TOWHALL.COM
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2015/06/17/ohio-committee-passes-bill-to-make-itthe-second-state-to-ban-abortions-based-on-down-syndrome-n2013783 [https://perma.cc/V7W83HAF].
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in Louisiana, most Republican committee members left the hearing
room when opponents of a 2014 admitting privileges bill testified. 248 In
Texas, a 2015 fetal abnormality abortion bill was brought up for a
committee vote at night after the House recessed and all seven
committee Democrats were absent—the measure was then approved
by an 8-0 vote. 249 In North Carolina, pro-life Republicans proposed
amending a bill prohibiting the recognition of foreign law in family
courts to include a raft of anti-abortion restrictions (physician opt-out,
ban on sex-selection abortions, mandating primary doctors to stay in
the room throughout the abortion, and more). 250 The amendment was
introduced at 5:30pm the Friday before July 4th weekend; it was
approved by both the committee and the full Senate on the next
business day. Following a threatened veto, the provision was removed
and subsequently attached to a motorcycle safety bill (that the
governor was willing to sign). 251
No doubt the Casey compromise broke down in the period since
2010. Bipartisanship, civility, and a general willingness to operate
within boundaries set by the Supreme Court have given way to partyline voting, interest group capture, procedural maneuvering, and a
willingness to push out or even contradict boundaries set by the
Supreme Court. Democratic discourse does not take place in such a
winner-take-all environment; correspondingly, as the political discord
of the past few years demonstrates, Casey’s indeterminate undue
burden standard no longer furthers judicial minimalism’s goal of
enhancing democratic deliberation. Instead, the undue burden
248. See Teddy Wilson, Louisiana Senate Committee Passes Omnibus Anti-Abortion Bill, RH
REALITY CHECK (May 7, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/05/07/louisiana-senatecommittee-passes-omnibus-anti-abortion-bill/ [https://perma.cc/N5ST-M38S]. Democrats did
precisely the same thing—all but two left to listen to opposing testimony. See id.
249. See Alex Ura & Julián Aguilar, House Will Take Up Abortion Insurance Coverage Ban,
THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 24, 2015), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/24/abortion-ban-acainsurance-plans-all-dead/ [ https://perma.cc/7G3R-RLJ8]. Texas Democrats have also made use of
procedural devices and engaged in party-line voting. In 2013, Senator Wendy Davis temporarily
stalled an anti-abortion bill by launching a filibuster that prevented a vote before the end of a
special legislative session; specifically, Davis’s filibuster stopped the anti-abortion measure from
being put on a fast track that would exempt it from certain procedural rules. See Manny
Fernandez, Filibuster in Texas Senate Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/senate-democrats-in-texas-try-blocking-abortionbill-with-filibuster.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HY96-ERG9].
250. See Mark Binker, Senate Tacks Sweeping Abortion Legislation onto Sharia Law Bill,
WRAL.COM (July 2, 2013), http://www.wral.com/senate-tacks-sweeping-abortion-legislationonto-sharia-law-bill/12621503/ [https://perma.cc/2RGS-64BJ].
251. See Katie McDonough, North Carolina Passes Sweeping Abortion Restrictions Planted
in Motorcycle Safety Bill, SALON (July 26, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/26/
north_carolina_passes_sweeping_abortion_restrictions_planted_in_motorcycle_safety_bill/
[https://perma.cc/X32W-5A84].

982

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:4:935

standard encourages the politically powerful to enact laws that
further their agenda; perhaps the law will be upheld 252 and, if not, the
very enactment of these laws strengthens intra-party allegiance
(party-line voting) and strengthens party ties to interest group
constituents that back these laws. Indeed, as is generally true of
position-taking measures, what matters most is taking a position—not
the judicial validation of that position. 253 In other words, the political
incentives underlying today’s abortion wars are likely to fuel even
more abortion battles—especially if the Supreme Court continues to
adhere to an open-ended standard that encourages lawmakers and
their constituents to experiment with new abortion regulations.
III. RETHINKING JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
Let me now connect the dots between my observations of
changes in abortion politics and the larger question of whether the
Supreme Court can facilitate constructive legal-political discourse by
favoring Casey-like minimalism over Roe-like maximalism. To start,
abortion politics underscore the need to take context into account
when assessing two of the principal virtues of minimalism: that
minimalism shifts attention away from the Court as the center of
controversy and, in so doing, that it provides space for competing sides
of divisive issues to engage in political discourse. 254 The lesson here is
striking—the quality of political discourse and the related possibility
of backlash is tied much more to context than it is to whether the
Court issued a maximalist decision intended to settle the issue and
foreclose discourse.
252. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1330–34 (arguing that Casey’s
indeterminacy allows pro-life Justices to uphold nearly any abortion regulation that a state
might approve); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 199, at 32–39 (highlighting conflicting
interpretations of Casey by federal court of appeals judges).
253. See supra note 133.
254. Minimalism may be preferred for other reasons. The Court might fear judicial error by
basing a maximalist opinion on facts that are disputed or an incomplete factual record.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 154, 255. The Court might also prefer the flexibility afforded by
malleable opinions—so that they can subsequently moderate without overruling. See Devins,
Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1322. Relatedly, the Court might prefer minimalism simply
because the Justices cannot agree on a maximalist standard; relatedly, the Justices might prefer
to rule unanimously and a minimalist standard cloaks disagreements in their thinking. See
Adam Liptak, Compromise at the Supreme Court Veils Its Rifts, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/supreme-court-term-marked-by-unanimousdecisions.html [http://perma.cc/AZS6-UV5K]; Robert Barnes, For These Supreme Court Justices,
POST
(July
1,
2014),
Unanimous
Doesn’t
Mean
Unity,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/for-these-supreme-court-justicesunanimous-doesnt-mean-unity/2014/07/01/94003590-0132-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9VDZ-DSWV].

2016]

RETHINKING JUDICIAL MINIMALISM

983

Roe’s maximalism did not stop pro-choice and pro-life interests
from talking with each other in the years following the decision. At
that time, the parties were not sharply divided over abortion and
party politics did not stand in the way of conversations related to
abortion rights. 255 Indeed, Republicans were marginally more prochoice than Democrats during the 1973–1992 period and, perhaps for
this reason, state efforts to limit abortion rights were bipartisan,
politically popular, and rarely challenged judicial authority. 256 That is
not to say that Casey-like minimalism would not have facilitated
democratic deliberation at that time. In particular, Roe contributed to
an emerging party realignment—where Democrats and Republicans
would divide over issues in ways that cut against discourse and
consensus. 257 Roe, too, undermined discourse by giving pro-choice
interests incentives to go to court and not engage in political discourse
with pro-life interests. 258 And while there is no way of knowing
whether a minimalist opinion at the time of Roe would have allowed
for a bipartisan, populist consensus to form around limited abortion
rights, it is certain that the journey from Roe to Casey was a bumpy
one. 259 At the same time, Roe critics overstate the decision’s
deleterious impact on politics and the related backlash. 260
Casey likewise underscores that the question of whether
minimalism works or does not work is inextricably linked to the
question of whether opposing sides of an issue can engage in
meaningful discourse with each other. From 1992–2009, Casey’s
minimalism worked fairly well at the state level. Unlike Congress and
the White House (where partisan polarization was in full flight), the
states were not similarly divided. 261 Ideological rankings of state
lawmakers—based on 1996 to 2006 data—suggest that state identity
was, at that time, a more useful proxy of ideology than party

255. These conversations were not necessarily about the scope of abortion rights. Pro-choice
and pro-life interests at the time of Roe, for example, sought common ground on child welfare
policy. See Ziegler, Beyond Backlash, supra note 56.
256. See supra tbl. 2.
257. See supra notes 112–119.
258. For a related discussion of how such “judicial overhang” limits constitutional discourse
in Congress, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
259. Casey, after all, overruled Supreme Court decisions rejecting twenty-four-hour waiting
requirements and informed consent. If the Court had initially issued a minimalist opinion and
then allowed a consensus to form around such laws, the Court could have abated much of the
post-Roe rancor.
260. See supra notes 129–132, 143–149.
261. See supra notes 112–123.
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identity: 262 Republican lawmakers in liberal states were not especially
conservative and Democrats in conservative states were not very
liberal. 263 A study of 1970–2004 voters similarly suggested that voters
linked ideology and party identity at the federal level but not at the
state level. 264 Before 2010, moreover, half the states were under
divided party control and most had been under divided control in
recent years. 265 The consequence of this is that state lawmakers were
more willing to compromise across party lines and more likely to
attend to public opinion. 266 On abortion, public preferences generally
cut in favor of moderation: 2008 polling data showed a substantial
number of Democrats (one-third) were pro-life and an equally large
number of Republicans (one-third) were largely pro-choice. 267 Against
this backdrop, state lawmakers did not follow the lead of their federal
counterparts by using abortion as a wedge to divide the parties; for the
most part, state lawmakers came together in bipartisan ways to enact
broadly popular legislation. This was especially true in the first
several years after Casey when a broad cross-section of states enacted
many of the laws approved by the Casey Court. 268 In other words,
Casey’s ability to facilitate dialogue and mitigate backlash varied with
the degree of polarization in government: Casey did not calm the
abortion flames at the federal level while, at the same time, it seemed
to advance the goals of minimalism at the state level.
Following the 2010 elections and the advent of one party
control of state government, Casey-minimalism no longer works.
Today, forty-two states are under single-party control (thirty

262. See Gerald C. Wright & Nathaniel Birkhead, The Macro Sort of the State Electorates,
67 POL. RES. Q. 426, 426–39 (2014).
263. See id. at 432.
264. See John Dinan & Jac Heckelman, Convergence and Divergence in State Political
Behavior, 1970–2004, 47 SOC. SCI. J. 689, 689–97 (2010).
265. See Dan Balz, Red, Blue States Move in Opposite Directions in a New Era of SingleParty Control, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/red-bluestates-move-in-opposite-directions-in-a-new-era-of-single-party-control/2013/12/28/9583d922673a-11e3-ae56-22de072140a2_story.html [https://perma.cc/X5M5-XXHS].
266. See id.; see also Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democracy Deficit in the
States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148–61 (2012).
267. This data and its implications are discussed in Alan I. Abramowitz & Morris P. Fiorina,
Polarized or Sorted? Just What’s Wrong with Our Politics, Anyway?, AM. INT. (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/03/11/polarized-or-sorted-just-whats-wrong-with-ourpolitics-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/PSD3-PT9A].
268. See supra notes 170-171; Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1339. With that said,
a handful of deep red states—towards the end of this period—began pushing the boundaries of
what Casey allowed; in those states, Republicans were firmly in control of the state legislature
and those lawmakers worked closely with pro-life groups committed to the undoing of abortion
rights. See id. at 1345–49; supra notes 181-183.
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Republican and twelve Democrat); 269 unified control—as detailed in
political science studies—cuts against negotiation and increases the
likelihood of state policy being “far more polarized than public
preferences.” 270 Consequently, even though median voter attitudes on
abortion are largely stable, 271 elected officials and their interest group
constituents advocate for partisanship and against compromise and
conversation. State lawmakers push the boundaries of (and even
contradict) Casey; 272 they also shut out those who disagree with them
through party-line voting, pursuing model legislation written by
interest groups, and engaging in procedural moves intended to stymie
pro-choice lawmakers. 273 In other words, today’s political conditions
are ill-suited for democracy-enhancing judicial minimalism.
The future is also bleak for judicial minimalism. There is no
indication that the modern era of single party politics will abate and,
if anything, there is increasing evidence that today’s partisanship will
accelerate—especially with respect to the willingness of lawmakers
and their constituents to compromise and consider opposing
positions. 274 Democrats and Republicans alike have become more
sharply divided into ideological camps that view each other with
hostility, a process that has been labeled ‘affective polarization.’ 275 In
part, this growth is a product of partisan sorting, which causes
partisan identification to reinforce ideological identification. Whatever
its cause, the effect is that political opponents hate each other—so
much so that party affiliation is a form of “personal identity” that
shapes not just politics “but also decisions about dating, marriage and
269. See supra note 208.
270. Lax & Phillips, supra note 266, at 149; see also Balz, supra note 265; Karl Kurtz, These
Unified States, LEGISLATURES, May 2013, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/
articles/2013/SL_0513-UnifiedStates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GGG-EBWD].
For
general
treatments of the disjunction between highly polarized political class and median voters, see
Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class Versus the People,
in RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 49,
51–52 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2002); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams,
Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008).
271. See Abortion: Gallup Historical Trends, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/
abortion.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/D4RT-H27M] (tracing 1975–2015
abortion attitudes).
272. See supra notes 214–230.
273. See supra notes 232–251.
274. See Alan I. Abramowitz, Partisan Nation: The Rise of Affective Polarization and the
American Electorate, in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES 23, 23–36 (John C. Green et al. eds., 7th ed.
2014) (tracking ever-increasing partisanship among the American electorate from 1972–2012);
Abramowitz, supra note 194, at 14–16 (arguing that the Tea Party movement and Republican
conservatism have deep roots and are likely to continue).
275. See Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social
Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 406 (2012).
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hiring.” 276 Needless to say, affective polarization’s greatest impact is
on matters involving politics and policy. Using a 100 point scale, a
person’s own party is ranked a seventy-two and the opposing party a
thirty in 2012; in the 1980 to 1992 period, the rankings were around
seventy for one’s own party and forty to forty-five for the opposing
party. 277 Perhaps more telling, a 2013 study found that individuals
with excellent quantitative skills were particularly likely to ignore or
discount statistical information that cut against their political views—
making it particularly difficult for competing camps to agree on the
underlying facts of a policy dispute. 278 And if that is not enough, voters
rarely seek out information, and the information they seek out has
little to do with educating themselves. 279 Instead, information is
typically sought out to back up preexisting policy preferences. 280 In the
context of elections, “the behavior of partisans resembles that of sports
team members acting to preserve the status of their teams rather than
thoughtful citizens participating in the political process for the
broader good”; 281 correspondingly, campaigns increasingly focus on
bringing out the “partisan base,” and increasingly make use of
negative advertising that is most likely to appeal to partisan dislike of
276. Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Partyism’ Now Trumps Racism, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-22/partyism-now-trumps-racism
[https://perma.cc/5XVM-5HXR]. For example, half of all Republicans and one-third of all
Democrats now say they would be upset if their child were to marry someone from the other
party (as compared to five percent in 1960). Id.
277. For a discussion of this and other related studies, see Ezra Klein & Alvin Chang,
“Political Identity Is Fair Game for Hatred”: How Republicans and Democrats Discriminate, VOX
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/12/7/9790764/partisan-discrimination [https://perma.cc/
23S4-SLXT].
278. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government 1–31
(Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 307, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319992 [https://perma.cc/UQ68-7NKT].
279. For this reason, minimalism—even in times of low polarization—should not be pursued
to shift power to the American people to engage in so-called “popular constitutionalism.” There is
simply no reason to think that increasing judicial deference to decision making by elected
officials will result in more engaged constitutional discourse by the American people. See Neal
Devins, The D’Oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1340–46 (2007); Ilya
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1340–52 (2004).
280. Ilya Somin has written extensively on this topic, highlighting social science data
showing that “unreflective bias actually represents rational behavior for most voters.” Ilya
Somin, Opinion, The Disturbing Growth of Partisan Bias, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/09/this-is-your-brain-onpolitics-the-disturbing-growth-of-partisan-bias/ [https://perma.cc/QJL6-UQZV]; see also ILYA
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 62–89
(2013); Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political
Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 260–62 (2006).
281. Patrick R. Miller & Pamela Johnston Conover, Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan
Hostility and Voting in the United States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 225, 225 (2015).
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the other party. 282 The consequences of affective polarization are
profound: the very virtues of minimalism (compromise and discourse)
are turned on their head and a minimalist decision is particularly
likely to prove divisive as competing sides seek to fill in gaps in highly
partisan ways.
None of this is to say that Erwin Chemerinsky’s heroic vision of
Supreme Court decision making is without its own risks. Even
assuming that Chemerinsky is right and that the Court’s raison d’être
is the protection of minority rights, 283 the Court might overvalue one
political minority at the expense of another. 284 The Court might also
galvanize political opponents of the ruling. As responses to Roe, Casey,
and many other decisions make clear, 285 the Supreme Court cannot—
as it did in Casey—simply call on “contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division” and accept the Court’s
decision as binding. 286
At the same time, judicial minimalism does not suit today’s
hyper-polarized political environment. Correspondingly, it does not
matter if Erwin Chemerinsky overstates matters when arguing that
the Supreme Court is “more important” than any other institution “in
ensuring liberty and justice for all”; 287 the benefits of Chemerinsky’s
heroic model seem stronger today than ever before. First, a potential
failing of the heroic model—its reliance on the Court at the expense of
democratic deliberation—is arguably a strength in todays’ world of
winner-take-all politics. Red states will enact one set of laws and blue
states another set of laws. 288 In the world of single-party control of
282. Iyengar et al., supra note 275, at 424 (campaigns are increasingly negative and
partisan); Matt Levendusky, Sorting in the U.S. Mass Electorate 2 (Mar. 21, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (campaigns increasingly focus on bringing out the partisan
base).
283. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About the Supreme Court’s Successes and
Failures, 69 VAND. L. REV. 919 (2016); Brian Fitzpatrick, A Tribute to Justice Scalia: Why Bad
Cases Make Bad Methodology, 69 VAND. L. REV. 991 (2016); Corinna Barrett Lain, Three
Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1022–
23 (2016); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Broken-Hearted Lover: Erwin Chemerinsky’s Romantic
Longings for a Mythical Court, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2016).
284. On abortion, for example, pro-life interests claim that the fetus is an unprotected
minority. On affirmative action, interest groups representing Asian Americans claim that
affirmative action wrongly elevates the interest of one set of minorities ahead of other minorities.
See Ellen Wexler, ‘This Case Shouldn’t Be Here Again’: Activists Outside the Supreme Court on
‘Fisher’ and Race, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 9, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/ThisCase-Shouldn-t-Be/234552 [https://perma.cc/8KC4-G9FV].
285. Chemerinsky, supra note 283, at 932; Rosenberg, supra note 283, at 1092.
286. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
287. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 342.
288. Along the same lines, red and blue state attorneys generally divide over whether to
defend same sex marriage bans, gun control laws, and other laws that divide the parties. See
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deep-red or deep-blue states, minimalism simply allows the dominant
political coalition to have its way; there is no prospect that judicial
minimalism facilitating constructive democratic discourse and even
minimalism’s best known proponent, Cass Sunstein, has written about
“the destructive power of partyism.” 289 Indeed, there is reason to think
that minimalism exacerbates political discord; its very open-endedness
suggests that competing sides of a political dispute can seek judicial
validation of their political victories—so that the pursuit of mandatory
ultrasounds, admitting privileges, and other laws is arguably tied to
the fact that these laws might be upheld as constitutional.
Second (and relatedly), the benefits of the Court setting forth
clear rules that provide guidance to lower courts is stronger in today’s
polarized world. One of the arguments for minimalism is that it allows
lower courts to incrementally sort out facts and engage in a dialogue
with each other, political actors, and the Supreme Court over time. 290
At the same time, if there is little pay-out for minimalism vis-à-vis the
facilitation of beneficial discourse, it may be that the argument for
predictability in law weighs in favor of maximalism, not
minimalism. 291 In particular, it is increasingly true that minimalism—
by failing to dictate whether a court should uphold or invalidate 292—
allows increasingly partisan judges to apply vague standards in ways
that support desired policy choices. 293 In the Whole Health case now
Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty
Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2100 (2015).
289. Sunstein, supra note 276.
290. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8; Peters, supra note 32, at 1460–76.
291. Predictability comes in two forms and it is important to draw a distinction between the
two—one type of predictability (which is what I refer to) is the binding effect of Supreme Court
decisions on lower courts. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1–59 (2009) (defending vertical maximalism within judicial branches).
The other type of predictability is the supremacy of Court rulings over political actors. I think
that neither is possible nor desirable. For a defense of judicial supremacy precisely because law
should stabilize and provide predictability, see Larry Alexander & Fred Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359–87 (1997). For my
critique of Alexander-Schauer, see Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 83–106 (1998).
292. Minimalism, in other words, eschews rules in favor of standards. Rules provide ex ante
instruction of whether behavior is legal or illegal; standards do not provide such instruction and
give content ex post, that is, after a state has acted. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557–629 (1992).
293. On how it is that party labels and judicial decision making are increasingly linked, see
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:27 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_court_s_partisa
n_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html [https://perma.cc/3YB7-2A3N]; Adam Liptak, The
Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/thepolarized-court.html [https://perma.cc/WMF2-JAJJ]; Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech
N.Y.
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before the Supreme Court, for example, it seems quite relevant that
Texas’s admitting privileges statute was reviewed by the conservative
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 294 Other circuits have invalidated
admitting privileges requirements and, more generally, federal courts
of appeal have divided over the application of the Casey undue burden
standard. 295 Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that partisans
on the Senate Judiciary Committee now fight tooth and nail over
federal court of appeals nominations—so much so that the thenDemocratic majority suspended the Senate filibuster rule in 2013 in
order to push through the confirmation of Obama court of appeals
picks. 296 And while the embrace of maximalism will not end such
political fights, 297 the benefits of higher courts dictating outcomes to
lower courts still seem stronger.
Third and finally, critics of Roe and other heroic decisions
overstate how much minimalism mitigates backlash risks. Resistance
to the Court is tied at least as much to political context as it is to the
scope and sweep of judicial rulings. Roe critics overstate the backlash
following that decision; states, in particular, sought to operate within
the decision’s boundaries. 298 In contrast, states have pushed harder at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/in-justices-votes-free-speech-often-means-speechi-agree-with.html [https://perma.cc/8Q9M-MWLL] (discussing partisanship in conjunction with
studies conducted by Lee Epstein).
294. See Linda Greenhouse, Abortion at the Supreme Court’s Door, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/opinion/abortion-at-the-supreme-courts-door.html
[https://perma.cc/H9N3-ZV4F]. The Texas law also includes ambulatory surgical facilities
requirements—so the Fifth Circuit ruling speaks to the combined impact of these provisions.
295. See Devins, Abortion Wars, supra note 9, at 1330–34 (noting that Casey was sufficiently
indeterminate that pro-choice Justices could regularly invalidate and pro-life Justices could
regularly approve a broad spectrum of abortion regulations); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note
199, at 33–40 (detailing the dispute over the application of the undue burden standard in the
context of admitting-privileges litigation).
296. On the general topic of judicial confirmation politics and courts of appeals nominees,
see Binder & Maltzman, supra note 159; Carl Hulse, Blocked Bids to Fill Judgeships Stir New
Fight on Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/us/politics/
filibuster-stirs-a-new-battle-on-us-judges.html; David Leonhardt, The Endless Battle Over
Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/
sunday/the-endless-battle-over-judicial-nominees.html [https://perma.cc/SVL5-VQKH]; Rachel
Weiner, White House Withdraws Caitlin Halligan Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/03/22/white-house-withdrawscaitlin-halligan-nomination/ [https://perma.cc/3LPB-JZSH]. On the suspension of the filibuster,
see Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poisedto-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/
d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html?hpid=z1 [https://perma.cc/D89M-9XG2].
297. Maximalism rarely eliminates all discretion and, of course, there are many issues that
the Supreme Court is yet to address—where the lower court ruling will be binding unless the
Supreme Court formally grants review to consider the question.
298. See supra notes 129–132, 143–149.
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Casey’s boundaries since 2010 and twenty-week bans are flatly
inconsistent with the decision. 299 In other words, a Supreme Court
Justice should not choose Casey minimalism over Roe maximalism
simply to obviate backlash risks. Indeed, it is possible that
minimalism prompts backlash by triggering political discord.
I want to close on a personal note: After thirty years of writing
about the benefits of constitutional dialogues between the Court and
elected government (including critiques of Erwin Chemerinsky’s
heroic vision of judicial review), I find it a bit strange to herald the
advantages of the heroic model and the impossibility of democracyforcing minimalism. But, sadly, that is how I feel about the state of
politics today; the Court might as well take the lead, provide guidance
to lower courts, and recognize that Court decision making is less
influential in shaping today’s polarized political discourse than I (or
others) had imagined. In making this point though, I also recognize
that polarized politics mean a partisan Court and that it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will advance Erwin Chemerinsky’s brand of
heroism. Whether that happens or not, the Court might as well
advance its legal policy vision as it sees fit; the Court should not leave
things undecided so as to obviate backlash or facilitate democratic
discourse.

299. See supra notes 220–230.

